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ABSTRACT 
Facing the Unknown: Behavioural Experiments for Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Elizabeth A. Hebert, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2015 
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is a dispositional characteristic that arises from negative 
beliefs about uncertainty and its implications (Koerner & Dugas, 2006). IU is an important factor 
in both the development and maintenance of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; APA, 2013). A 
cognitive-behavioural treatment (CBT) for GAD that targets IU and additional factors has shown 
robust efficacy across five randomized controlled trials. IU is a key cognitive mechanism in this 
treatment, as reductions in IU precede (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Goldman, Dugas, Sexton, & 
Gervais, 2007) and mediate reductions in GAD symptoms (Donegan et al., 2010). Despite these 
encouraging results, approximately 20-30% of individuals do not achieve full GAD remission by 
posttreatment. Non-remitted individuals continue to endorse elevated IU. Moreover, established 
CBT protocols for GAD are often lengthy and complex, involving multiple therapeutic 
techniques. Thus, GAD treatment development and evaluation must consider parsimony and 
efficiency in addition to efficacy. To that end, we developed a novel, focused CBT protocol that 
targets IU exclusively via behavioural experiments. This cognitive-behavioural technique is an 
experiential method of testing idiosyncratic beliefs (here, beliefs about uncertainty). Participants 
with a primary diagnosis of GAD (N = 7) completed 12 sessions of this CBT protocol with a 
licensed clinical psychologist at a local Montreal hospital. Treatment consisted of three 
components: (1) psychoeducation and uncertainty awareness training; (2) behavioural 
experiments targeting beliefs about uncertainty, and (3) relapse prevention. Our results suggest 
that this CBT protocol produces substantial reductions in GAD symptomatology, IU, and general 
psychopathology by posttreatment. These changes were generally maintained across a 6-month 
follow-up period, with some deterioration in safety behaviours, general anxiety, and depression. 
The majority of participants (6/7) demonstrated moderate to high end-state functioning from 
posttreatment to 6-month follow-up. Additionally, we examined rapid, non-linear changes in IU, 
worry, and safety behaviours between treatment sessions. Results indicated that sudden gains in 
IU tended to occur first and that sudden gains occurring early in treatment were associated with 
improved long-term treatment outcomes. Overall, our findings suggest that the systematic 
  iv 
application of behavioural experiments alone may provide substantial reductions in GAD 
symptoms and IU. 
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Facing the Unknown: Behavioural Experiments for Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is a dispositional characteristic that results from a set of 
negative beliefs about uncertainty and its consequences (Koerner & Dugas, 2006). IU is a key 
factor in the development and maintenance of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; APA, 2013), a 
common and debilitating illness characterized by excessive worry and anxiety. IU has also been 
increasingly implicated in other psychopathology, including obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006), panic disorder (Boswell, Thompson-Hollands, Farchione, 
& Barlow, 2013), major depressive disorder, social anxiety disorder (Carleton et al., 2012), and 
eating disorders (Guido et al., 2012). Refining our therapeutic approach to IU may therefore 
significantly impact the treatment of GAD as well as other disorders. In GAD, IU has 
traditionally been targeted directly via behavioural exposure, as well as through indirect methods 
such as motivational interviewing for positive beliefs about worry, problem solving training, and 
imaginal exposure for worry. Together, these cognitive-behavioural techniques compose an 
established, efficacious CBT protocol for GAD (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007) commonly known 
as CBT-IU. This protocol produces significant reductions in GAD symptoms (e.g., Dugas & 
Ladouceur, 2000; Gosselin, Ladouceur, Morin, Dugas, & Baillargeon, 2006; Ladouceur et al., 
2000a), with posttreatment remission rates ranging from 70% (Dugas et al., 2010) to 80% (van 
der Heiden, Muris, & van der Molen, 2012). Although these results are encouraging, this means 
that a substantial minority of individuals do not fully benefit from treatment. These non-remitted 
individuals continue to endorse high levels of IU at posttreatment (Donegan & Dugas, 2013). 
Given that reductions in IU precede (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Goldman, Dugas, Sexton, & 
Gervais, 2007) and mediate reductions in GAD symptoms during treatment (Donegan et al., 
2010), optimizing IU-based treatment may produce greater reductions in GAD symptoms. A 
related, but more modest, proposal is that GAD treatment may become more parsimonious, time-
efficient, and cost-effective by refining our therapeutic approach to IU. The main goal of the 
current program of research was to develop and evaluate a novel treatment protocol that targets 
IU using a single therapeutic technique: behavioural experiments. 
IU and GAD: A Brief History 
 2 
 
Researchers at Laval University conceptualized IU partially in response to puzzling 
clinical observations of GAD: symptoms appeared resistant to the cognitive restructuring 
techniques traditionally used to treat anxiety, such as re-evaluating the probability and cost of 
feared outcomes. Clients with GAD reported that their worries persisted unless absolute certainty 
could be achieved. This inability to tolerate even minute quantities of uncertainty perpetuates 
anxiety and worry (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007; Hebert, Senn, & Dugas, in press).  
The association between IU and GAD symptoms has been cemented via experimental 
and treatment-based research. IU is a predictor of non-clinical levels of worry (Khawaja & 
Chapman, 2007), and is the strongest predictor of excessive worry (Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 
2004). IU is a specific vulnerability factor for GAD symptoms in clinical (Norton, Sexton, 
Walker, & Norton, 2005) and non-clinical samples (Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003). 
Although IU has now been associated with disorders other than GAD (e.g., Carleton et al., 
2012), non-clinical investigations have found that it is more related to worry than to depressive 
symptoms (Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 2004), obsessions, or symptoms of panic (Dugas, 
Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001). Dugas, Marchand, and Ladouceur (2005) also found IU to be 
specific to GAD, unlike cognitive avoidance, negative problem orientation, and positive beliefs 
about worry. In clinical samples, greater GAD severity predicts greater IU scores (Dugas et al., 
2007). Worry itself, the hallmark of GAD, also demonstrates a unique relationship to IU. Worry 
has stronger associations with IU than with perfectionism or need for control, independent of the 
influences of anxiety and depression (Buhr & Dugas, 2006). Experimental manipulations of IU 
also produce changes in worry: worry increases in participants who undergo an IU induction as 
compared to participants whose level of IU is decreased (Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000b; 
Rosen & Knaüper, 2009). IU thus shares a robust relationship with GAD, despite its association 
with other disorders (Hebert et al., in press). 
Clinical Conceptualization of IU in GAD 
In the standard CBT-IU protocol (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007), treatment is guided by a 
cognitive-behavioural conceptualization of GAD in which worry takes centre stage (see Figure 
1). In this model, the situation triggers a “What if…?” question in the mind of a person with 
GAD. This initial “What if…?” question begins the cycle of worry, leading to anxiety, 




Figure 1. Standard cognitive-behavioural model of intolerance of uncertainty and generalized 





underpins “What if…?” questions, worry, and anxiety. IU also impacts this cycle indirectly 
through related cognitive mechanisms, including positive beliefs about worry, negative problem 
orientation, and cognitive avoidance. The individual’s current emotional state as well as life 
events impact all aspects of this cycle, acknowledging the important role of personal history and 
life stressors on GAD symptoms (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006; Moffit et al., 2007; Kendler, 
Hettema, Butera, Gardner, & Prescott, 2003).  
This standard CBT conceptualization of IU and GAD has a number of strengths. First, it 
focuses on worry, widely considered to be the hallmark symptom of GAD. Given that GAD was 
regarded as a nebulous entity until the introduction of worry in the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987), this 
model highlights both the conceptual and historical importance of worry in GAD. Excessive and 
uncontrollable worry is recognizable as a specific diagnostic criterion of GAD, setting it apart 
from the criteria of other clinical disorders (Andrews et al., 2010). Second, IU is integrated into  
the majority of model components, highlighting its empirically-supported relationship with GAD 
symptoms. Third, the CBT-IU model integrates a number of additional cognitive mechanisms 
beyond IU that maintain GAD symptoms. For instance, cognitive avoidance has been highlighted 
in several additional models of worry and anxiety (e.g., Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; 
Newman & Llera, 2011). Finally, the model appears to be readily understood by both clinicians 
and clients and thus has significant clinical utility. 
However, the standard CBT conceptualization of IU and GAD also has a number of 
drawbacks. First, the omission of uncertainty itself may make it more difficult for clients and 
clinicians to differentiate the state of uncertainty from its antecedents (i.e., situational triggers) 
and consequences (e.g., worry, anxiety). Second, the standard model does not specify how IU 
impacts the remaining components. Clients may benefit from a more detailed explanation as to 
how IU links the state of uncertainty and GAD symptoms. Third, behavioural symptoms of GAD 
do not appear in this model. Historically, GAD diagnostic criteria have not included behavioural 
symptoms – an anomaly amongst the anxiety disorders (Beesdo-Baum et al., 2012; Rapee, 
1985). However, researchers and clinicians alike increasingly highlight the presence and 
importance of behavioural symptoms in GAD, such as reassurance seeking (Beesdo-Baum et al., 
2012), procrastination (Stöber & Joorman, 2001), and refusal to delegate tasks to others (Dugas 
& Robichaud, 2007). Finally, the central placement of worry implies both temporal and 
theoretical precedence of worry over other GAD symptoms, such as anxiety and safety 
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behaviours. For these reasons, a new cognitive-behavioural conceptualization of IU and GAD 
symptoms was warranted. 
Novel cognitive-behavioural conceptualization of IU. Our novel cognitive-behavioural 
treatment model has many familiar elements, but is centered upon IU rather than GAD 
symptoms (see Figure 2). IU is the most prominent feature of this model, highlighting its 
importance as a maintenance factor for GAD symptoms. This aligns with our overarching 
clinical goal of targeting IU more directly throughout therapy. The centrality of IU may also 
increase the model’s applicability to other disorders – an important consideration given the 
increasing transdiagnostic appeal of IU (e.g., Carleton et al., 2012; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012). 
 Our new model begins with specific situational properties: ambiguity, novelty, and 
unpredictability. These three situational characteristics have an established relationship with 
anxiety (e.g., Lanzetta & Driscoll, 1966; Pervin, 1963) and have been theorized to induce 
uncertainty (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007; Krohne, 1989; 1993). We define uncertainty as the 
internal state of not knowing or being unsure (Hebert et al., in press). Although situations 
themselves are often colloquially referred to as “uncertain”, it is critical clinically to distinguish 
between the internal experience of uncertainty and the situational characteristics that induce this 
state. For instance, clients may find that not all ambiguous, novel, or unpredictable situations 
induce uncertainty. This enhances therapeutic understanding and may later aid in decreasing IU. 
For individuals with high IU, we propose that the internal state of uncertainty will activate 
catastrophically negative beliefs about uncertainty. The specific catastrophic, negative belief 
about uncertainty activated will depend on the nature of the situation the individual finds him- or 
herself in. For instance, an individual who is uncertain while facing a new work task may have 
the thought “If I’m uncertain, I can’t move forward with my task” whereas another individual 
may have the thought “If I’m uncertain, it means I am terrible at my job”. These idiosyncratic, 
catastrophic beliefs about uncertainty have further emotional, cognitive, and behavioural 
consequences: namely, anxiety, worry, and safety behaviours. The exact nature of these 
emotional, cognitive, and behavioural sequelae will again depend on the specific situational 
characteristics and idiosyncratic beliefs about uncertainty that have been activated. For instance, 
the individual who feels uncertain in the face of a novel work task and has the belief that “If I’m 
uncertain, I can’t move forward” may feel anxious; begin to worry about their future at the 




Figure 2. Novel cognitive-behavioural conceptualization of intolerance of uncertainty and 




researching the labour market in their field. Like our standard conceptualization of GAD and IU, 
an individual’s current life events and emotional state impact all levels of this model. 
 In our new conceptual model, we propose that IU “runs in the background”, impacting 
each model component individually. Those with high IU may be more likely to notice the 
situational characteristics relevant to our model: ambiguity, novelty, and unpredictability. For 
instance, Dugas, Hedayati, and colleagues (2005) found that individuals with high IU had better 
recall for uncertainty-related stimuli. Once a situational trigger is noticed, individuals with high 
IU may be more likely to experience the state of uncertainty. Based on the very definition of IU, 
individuals high in IU are hypothesized to make negative interpretations of uncertainty (Koerner 
& Dugas, 2006; Krohne, 1989). We have refined this to catastrophically negative beliefs about 
uncertainty, in order to distinguish from the near-universal preference for certainty present in the 
general population (e.g., Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012; Brim & Hoff, 1957; Schmidt, 1998; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Once catastrophically negative beliefs about uncertainty are 
activated, we propose that individuals with high IU experience worry and anxiety and engage in 
a variety of safety behaviours. This is consistent with previous definitions of IU as the negative 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioural patterns that develop in response to uncertainty-inducing 
stimuli (Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994b). This is also largely consistent 
with previous theories that IU results in vigilant coping strategies (Krohne, 1989) as well as 
empirical findings that experimental increases in IU induce increases in worry (Ladouceur et al., 
2000b). In addition, those with high IU display greater information seeking behaviours than 
those with low IU (Rosen & Knaüper, 2009) and require more certainty cues when responding to 
ambiguous tasks (Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997). More indirectly, GAD status has been 
associated with a variety of safety behaviours such as reassurance-seeking and situational 
avoidance (Beesdo-Baum et al., 2012) and worry has a unique relationship to procrastination 
(Stöber & Joorman, 2001). Although we will examine our novel conceptual model indirectly 
through the current program of research, future investigations must empirically evaluate the 
specific relationship between model components. 
IU in GAD Treatment 
 IU has been traditionally targeted via behavioural exposure, a technique in which clients 
are asked to identify and enter into uncertainty-inducing situations. A largely habituation-based 
rationale is provided: repeatedly encountering and engaging with uncertainty-inducing triggers 
 8 
 
will reduce anxiety and worry over time (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). In combination with 
motivational interviewing for worry, problem-solving training, and imaginal exposure, 
behavioural exposure to uncertainty has been established as an efficacious treatment for GAD 
(e.g., Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Dugas et al., 2010; Ladouceur et al., 2000a). However, between 
20-30% of individuals do not achieve full GAD remission by posttreatment (Dugas et al., 2010; 
van der Heiden, Muris, & van der Molen, 2012). One possible explanation for this is that IU has 
not been fully ameliorated: at posttreatment, non-remitted individuals continue to experience 
elevated IU (Donegan & Dugas, 2013). This is underscored by the pre-posttreatment effect sizes 
typically achieved for IU, which are smaller than pre-posttreatment effect sizes for GAD 
symptoms (e.g., Donegan & Dugas, 2013). Taken together, this suggests that IU could be 
targeted more effectively during treatment. 
 Behavioural experiments for IU. Behavioural experiments are a cognitive-behavioural 
technique that asks clients to identify idiosyncratic beliefs and test them as hypotheses via 
predetermined behaviours (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Bennett-Levy et al., 2005). 
Behavioural experiments involve four main stages, conforming to the Lewin-Kolb experiential 
learning cycle (Kolb, 1984; Lewin, 1946): (1) planning, (2) experimentation, (3) observation, 
and (4) reflection. More specifically, behavioural experiments in our treatment protocol 
consisted of six steps: (1) identifying the problem; (2) identifying the belief about uncertainty to 
be tested; (3) identifying the prediction for the experiment, as well as any alternative 
possibilities; (4) planning the behavioural experiment, including when, where, how, and with 
whom it will be conducted; (5) conducting the experiment and recording the outcome; and (6) 
reflecting on what could be learned from the outcome of the behavioural experiment. 
Behavioural experiments were used to test either existing beliefs about uncertainty or new, 
alternative beliefs about uncertainty generated by the client. 
Behavioural experiments have a strong basis in cognitive-behavioural theories. Cognitive 
mediation theories of psychopathology suggest that reductions in the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying anxiety symptoms will lead to reductions in the anxiety symptoms themselves (e.g., 
Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1979). Behavioural experiments are consistent with cognitive mediation 
theory, as they target these underlying cognitive mechanisms. Behavioural experiments are 
hypothesized to reduce psychopathology symptoms via a combination of experiential learning 
and reflection (Kolb, 1984; Lewin, 1946), implicational and propositional information 
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processing (Teasdale, 1997; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993), and fear response extinction via 
violation of expectations (Bouton, 2004; McMillan & Lee, 2010). Due to the active, participatory 
nature of behavioural experiments, clients “learn by doing” as they design, carry out, and 
monitor the outcome of their experiments. The process of reflection following the behavioural 
experiment encourages the client to connect the behavioural experiment to the specific belief 
about uncertainty being tested and develop new beliefs as necessary. Initial experiential learning 
focuses on the existing landscape of uncertainty beliefs; in other words, clients conduct 
behavioural experiments to test what they already believe. The process of reflection encourages 
the generation of new beliefs, to then be evaluated in further experiential learning opportunities 
(Bennett-Levy et al., 2005; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). At the same time, behavioural 
experiments may impact both propositional and implicational systems of information processing, 
often expressed by clients as “intellectual” and “emotional” beliefs or the “head” and the “heart”. 
Behavioural experiments may allow clients to not only evaluate current beliefs, but to generate 
alternative mental models via novel experiences (Bennett-Levy et al., 2005; Bouton, 2004; 
Teasdale, 1997; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). This technique may violate outcome expectancies, 
thus facilitating fear response extinction via new inhibitory learning (Bouton, 2004). Behavioural 
experiments require clients to specify their predictions for the outcome of the experiment. Often, 
but not always, behavioural experiments provide disconfirmatory experiences that violate these 
expectations. This may promote extinction of fear (McMillan & Lee, 2010). Taken together, 
behavioural experiments represent a good theoretical fit with our new conceptual model, which 
centres on idiosyncratic beliefs about uncertainty. Because our conceptual framework places 
catastrophic beliefs about uncertainty “front-and-centre”, we believe that our clinical technique 
must also do so. Behavioural experiments are a particularly appropriate vehicle for this, as 
experiential and behavioural change are theorized as perhaps the most powerful methods for 
changing cognition (e.g., Bandura, 1977; Jacobson et al., 1996; Waller, 2009). 
Behavioural experiments for IU may have clinical advantages beyond traditional 
techniques. For example, a technique that focuses on beliefs about uncertainty rather than worry 
may be useful for GAD clients who focus excessively on the content of their worries during 
therapy sessions. This focus on beliefs about uncertainty may also be more effective than 
repeated exposure to uncertainty alone. Although a comparison of exposure and behavioural 
experiments in GAD has yet to be conducted, preliminary evidence suggests that, in general, 
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behavioural experiments may be more efficacious at reducing anxiety than exposure (McMillan 
& Lee, 2010; Salkovskis, Hackmann, Wells, Gelder, & Clark, 2006). Behavioural experiments 
can be conceptualized as cognitive change with a behavioural motor (Wells, 1997): in this case, 
individuals use pre-planned behaviours to induce a state of uncertainty and evaluate their 
uncertainty-relevant cognitions. This behaviourally-driven cognitive intervention may be 
particularly appropriate for clients with GAD, given that traditional cognitive techniques appear 
largely ineffective for GAD symptom reduction. For this reason, experiential learning may be 
especially important in GAD. As compared to thought records, behavioural experiments have 
been shown to reduce target cognitions more quickly and with greater generalization (McManus, 
van Doorn, & Yiend, 2012), and provide greater sensory information and higher emotional 
arousal (Bennett-Levy, 2003). Moreover, behavioural experiments appear more effective at 
changing target cognitions than exposure. If cognitive mediation is a mechanism of change in 
both behavioural experiments and exposure, then behavioural experiments may provide superior 
results (Raes, Koster, Loeys, & De Raedt, 2011). 
Goals for Current Program of Research 
 The overarching goals for this program of research were to design a novel CBT protocol 
targeting IU and to evaluate this protocol within a GAD population. More specifically, we were 
interested in designing and evaluating a streamlined, parsimonious, and efficient protocol that 
would target IU via behavioural experiments. To our knowledge, there is no established GAD 
treatment that uses behavioural experiments exclusively, nor is there a behavioural experiment-
driven treatment for IU. In fact, previously published clinical resources for behavioural 
experiments in GAD often appear aimed increasing feelings of certainty and attempting to 
resolve ambiguity (Butler & Rouf, 2005). Thus, a CBT protocol that exclusively targets IU using 
behavioural experiments represents a novel advancement in the field. We were concerned with 
not only determining if the protocol was efficacious, but also how change occurred. Thus, we 
conducted a preliminary evaluation of the CBT protocol’s efficacy in reducing IU and GAD 
symptoms as well as an assessment of the temporal sequence of change across treatment 
sessions. We evaluated both linear and non-linear change over time in IU and GAD symptoms to 





Challenging Uncertainty: Behavioural Experiments in the Treatment of Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder 
 Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is a debilitating illness characterized by chronic 
anxiety and excessive and uncontrollable worry (APA, 2013). Following its official recognition 
in the DSM-III (APA, 1980), clinicians noted that traditional cognitive restructuring approaches, 
such as re-evaluating the cost and probability of worries, were largely ineffective in reducing 
GAD symptoms (Hebert, Senn, & Dugas, in press). In response to this clinical observation, 
several efficacious treatments for GAD have been developed since the 1990s. These treatments 
have been largely based on cognitive-behavioural models of the disorder, including the cognitive 
avoidance model of worry (Borkovec, 1994), the metacognitive model (Wells, 1995), and the 
intolerance of uncertainty model (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998). Treatment-
based research in GAD has mainly focused on iterative improvements in efficacy. Given that 
several efficacious treatments have already been established, existing treatments should be 
refined (and new treatments designed) with a focus on parsimony and efficiency in addition to 
efficacy (Cougle, 2012). The present study focuses on the development and preliminary 
evaluation of a novel, three-component GAD treatment that utilizes behavioural experiments to 
target intolerance of uncertainty (IU). 
Intolerance of Uncertainty in GAD Treatment 
 IU is a dispositional characteristic arising from a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty 
and its consequences (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). IU has been conceptualized as a causal risk 
factor in the development of GAD symptoms, as well as a key maintenance factor of these 
symptoms. An established cognitive-behavioural treatment (CBT) for GAD targets IU directly 
via several sessions of behavioural exposure, as well as indirectly via re-evaluating the 
usefulness of worry, problem-solving training, and imaginal exposure for worry (Dugas & 
Robichaud, 2007). Although this treatment has demonstrated efficacy in four individual 
randomized controlled trials (Dugas et al., 2010; Gosselin, Ladouceur, Morin, Dugas, & 
Baillargeon, 2006; Ladouceur et al., 2000a; van der Heiden, Muris, van der Molen, 2012), 
approximately 20-30% of individuals do not achieve GAD remission by posttreatment. These 
symptomatic individuals continue to endorse elevated IU at post-treatment. In addition, pre-
posttreatment effect sizes for IU are smaller than those for GAD symptoms (Donegan & Dugas, 
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2013). Thus, although the standard CBT-IU protocol significantly reduces GAD 
symptomatology and IU, there is room for improvement. Moreover, CBT protocols that are not 
IU-specific produce short- and long-term reductions in IU comparable to that of the CBT-IU 
protocol, despite not addressing this variable directly (van der Heiden et al, 2012). This suggests 
that IU could be more effectively targeted within treatment. Given that reductions in IU precede 
reductions in worry (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000) and are an important mediator of GAD 
symptom reduction during treatment (Donegan et al., 2010), improving our ability to target IU is 
essential.  
One method of optimizing IU-focused treatment may be to alter the techniques used to 
target it. In the standard CBT-IU protocol, IU is targeted directly through behavioural exposure. 
Although behavioural exposure is an established therapeutic technique, emerging evidence 
suggests that behavioural experiments may be more effective than exposure (McMillan & Lee, 
2010; Salkovskis, Hackmann, Wells, Gelder, & Clark, 2006). Whereas behavioural exposure 
involves exposure to situations that evoke relevant symptoms and relies on a habituation-based 
paradigm of symptom reduction, behavioural experiments involve the identification and testing 
of idiosyncratic beliefs via predetermined behaviours or situations. Behavioural experiments may 
thus be particularly applicable to IU, given that IU is based on a set of negative beliefs about 
uncertainty. If individuals can identify and design experiments to test out their catastrophically 
negative beliefs about uncertainty, GAD symptoms are likely to decrease. This technique also 
allows individuals to identify and directly modify safety behaviours used to avoid uncertainty, 
such as refusing to delegate tasks, reassurance-seeking, and procrastination. 
Behavioural experiments are an ideal fit for our new cognitive-behavioural 
conceptualization of IU (see Figure 2). We propose that catastrophically negative beliefs about 
uncertainty, once activated by situational triggers, lead to the cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioural symptoms of GAD (i.e., worry, anxiety, and safety behaviours). Given the inherent 
structure and flexibility of this cognitive-behavioural technique, our novel treatment protocol 
exclusively relies on behavioural experiments to target IU. To our knowledge, no existing 
treatment protocol for GAD has systematically and exclusively used behavioural experiments to 
target either GAD symptoms or underlying process variables. The current CBT protocol 
consisted of 3 modules: (1) psychoeducation and uncertainty awareness training, (2) testing 
beliefs about uncertainty via behavioural experiments, and (3) relapse prevention.  
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Goals and Hypotheses 
 The main goal of this study was to conduct a preliminary evaluation of the efficacy of a 
novel IU-specific CBT protocol for GAD. We assessed treatment efficacy based on changes in 
GAD symptoms, general psychopathology, and IU. We evaluated these changes using remission 
rates, effect sizes (Cohen’s d), clinically significant change, and end-state functioning. First, we 
hypothesized that GAD symptoms, general psychopathology, and IU would significantly reduce 
from pre- to posttreatment, with at least moderate effect sizes. We predicted that at least 70% of 
participants would achieve GAD remission by posttreatment, consistent with the results of other 
IU-focused treatment studies (e.g., Dugas et al., 2010). Similarly, we predicted that the majority 
of participants would achieve clinically significant change on these measures. Second, we 
hypothesized that GAD symptoms, general psychopathology, and IU would remain stable from 
posttreatment to 6-month follow-up, with negligible to small effect sizes. We predicted that at 
least 70% of participants would be remitted across the follow-up period. We also predicted that 
the majority of participants would continue to have clinically significant change at 3- and 6-
month follow-ups. Finally, we hypothesized that the majority of participants would have at least 
moderate end-state functioning from posttreatment to 6-month follow-up. 
Method 
Participants 
 Seven Francophone participants (71.43% female) with a primary diagnosis of GAD took 
part in the study. A primary diagnosis of GAD consisted of a score of 4 or greater on the 
Clinician’s Severity Rating (CSR) from the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV 
(ADIS-IV; Di Nardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994), with no other disorder having a higher score. At 
pretreatment, participants had an average GAD severity rating of 5.5 (SD = 0.82) and had 
experienced GAD symptoms for an average of 20.37 years (SD = 19.00). Participants had a mean 
age of 47.29 years (SD = 12.31) and all self-identified as White. The majority of the sample 
(57.10%) endorsed current antidepressant usage. The same percentage of participants denied use 
of anxiolytics and prior psychotherapy experience. 
Procedures 
 Recruitment procedures. The study was approved by Human Research Ethics 
Committees of Concordia University and the Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal. Participants 
were self-referred to our clinic via advertisements placed in a local newspaper (see Appendix A). 
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Interested individuals completed a telephone screening following informed consent (see 
Appendix B). Retained individuals then completed two clinical interviews: the ADIS-IV with a 
licensed clinical psychologist and the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; 
Sheehan et al., 1998) with a team psychiatrist. A team meeting was then held to discuss the 
clinical interview results and arrive at a final diagnosis. Participants were included in the study if 
the following criteria were met: (1) primary diagnosis of GAD; (2) a total score of 58 or greater 
on the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, indicating high IU (Koerner & Dugas, 2008); (3) 18 
years of age or older; (4) French language fluency; (5) no current suicidal ideation; (6) no current 
or past history of bipolar depression or psychosis; (7) no current substance dependence or abuse; 
(8) no change in psychotropic medication dose or type for at least 12 weeks prior to the initial 
assessment; (9) willingness to maintain stable psychotropic medication for the 12-week 
treatment duration; and (10) not currently undergoing another psychological treatment. 
Individuals who did not meet the study’s inclusion criteria were provided with alternative 
resources, including services at the Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal or appropriate alternative 
referrals. 
 Assessment procedures. In addition to the pretreatment clinical interviews, participants 
completed a battery of self-report questionnaires (see Measures) using online software. These 
questionnaires assessed GAD symptoms, IU, and general psychopathology. During this clinic 
visit, participants also provided informed consent for treatment (see Appendix C). Participants 
completed these self-report questionnaires and the ADIS-IV again at mid-treatment, 
posttreatment, and at 3- and 6-month follow-ups. All assessments were conducted by one of two 
licensed clinical psychologists who did not conduct the treatment itself. 
 Treatment procedures. The CBT protocol for GAD was delivered over 12 weekly, 50-
minute sessions by a licensed clinical psychologist. To ensure treatment integrity, the study 
authors (E.A.H. and M.J.D.) and the therapist conducted weekly clinical supervision meetings. 
Treatment consisted of three main components: (1) psychoeducation and uncertainty awareness 
training, (2) testing beliefs about uncertainty via behavioural experiments, and (3) relapse 
prevention training. The first component presented clients with information about CBT, GAD, 
and the role of uncertainty in their symptoms. Clients were asked to monitor uncertainty and 
their reactions to uncertainty in their daily lives. This component was delivered over two 
sessions. The second treatment component focused on identifying and testing clients’ 
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idiosyncratic beliefs about uncertainty via behavioural experiments. Clients identified 
catastrophically negative interpretations of uncertainty via weekly monitoring and Socratic 
discussion. The therapist provided the rationale and steps for behavioural experiments, including 
planning and conducting the experiment, outcome monitoring, and reflection. The treatment 
manual included 60 possible behavioural experiments that could be selected from to target 
specific beliefs about uncertainty, including both negative and alternative beliefs. However, the 
therapist and participants were encouraged to generate personalized behavioural experiments 
based on each participant’s idiosyncratic beliefs about uncertainty. Thus, the behavioural 
experiments differed across participants. This treatment component was delivered over 9 
sessions and represented the bulk of therapy sessions. The final treatment component was 
composed of relapse prevention with a behavioural experiment focus. This included planning 
future behavioural experiments, applying a behavioural experiment framework to unexpected 
future events, and creating a plan of action to identify and manage possible increases in IU. The 
third component of treatment was delivered in one session. Participants were provided with a 
client manual of the treatment protocol to enhance their memory for the treatment procedures. 
Clinician-Rated Measures 
 The Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Di Nardo, Brown, & 
Barlow, 1994) is a semi-structured clinical interview that assesses anxiety, depressive, and other 
disorders. Clinicians rate the severity of each diagnosed condition on a 9-point Likert scale using 
the Clinician’s Severity Rating (CSR). Scores range from 0 (“absent or none”) to 8 (“very 
severe”), with a score of 4 representing clinically significant severity. The ADIS-IV 
demonstrates good inter-rater reliability for GAD diagnostic criteria ( = .67), and dimensional 
ratings of GAD (clinical severity rating r = .72, excessive worry r = .73, uncontrollable worry r = 
.78; Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001). 
 The Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview, Version 5.0 (MINI; Sheehan et al., 
1998) is a semi-structured clinical interview that assesses 17 DSM-IV-TR disorders, including 
anxiety and depressive disorders. In this study, the ADIS-IV CSR was used to rate the severity of 
each disorder diagnosed on the MINI. The MINI demonstrates excellent inter-rater reliability ( 




  The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 1994b) assesses the tendency to endorse negative beliefs about uncertainty and its 
consequences. The IUS consists of 27 items assessed on a 5-point Likert scale, with higher 
scores representing greater IU. The IUS demonstrates criterion, convergent, and divergent 
validity and excellent internal consistency ( = .91). The measure has a consistent two-factor 
structure. Factor 1 has been defined as “Uncertainty has negative self-referential and behavioural 
implications” (inhibitory IU) whereas Factor 2 has been defined as “Uncertainty is unfair and 
spoils everything” (prospective IU). 
 The Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (WAQ; Dugas et al., 2001) assesses GAD 
diagnostic criteria including excessive and uncontrollable worry and somatic anxiety symptoms. 
Each item is rated on an 8-point Likert scale, with greater scores corresponding to greater self-
rated symptoms of GAD. The French version of the WAQ has demonstrated adequate test-retest 
reliability over 64 days (r = .83 for those not meeting GAD diagnostic criteria; r = .75 for those 
meeting GAD diagnostic criteria). 
 The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990) is a self-report questionnaire assessing the tendency to worry excessively and 
uncontrollably. The measure consists of 16 items rated on a 5-point Likert scale, with greater 
scores corresponding to greater worry. The French version of the PSWQ has demonstrated 
excellent test-retest reliability over four weeks (r = .86; Gosselin, Dugas, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 
2001). 
The Generalized Anxiety Disorder – Safety Behaviours Questionnaire (GAD-SBQ; 
Hebert & Dugas, 2013) is an 18-item questionnaire designed for use in this study (see Appendix 
D). This self-report measure assesses the tendency to use safety behaviours that have been 
clinically associated with GAD and anxiety. Safety behaviours include reassurance-seeking, 
over-preparation, avoidance of uncertainty-inducing situations, and refusal to delegate tasks to 
others. Participants rate each item on a 5-point Likert scale with responses ranging from 1 (“not 
at all typical of me”) to 5 (“very typical of me”). Numerical item responses are summed to create 
the total score, with greater total scores corresponding to greater use of safety behaviours over 
the previous one-month period. 
 The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) is a 21-item 
self-report questionnaire that assesses cognitive, somatic, and affective anxiety symptoms over 
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the previous one-week period. The French translation of the BAI demonstrates convergent, 
divergent, and factorial validity, as well as adequate test-retest reliability (r = 0.63) and good 
internal consistency ( = .93; Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, Gagnon, & Rhéaume, 1994a).   
 The Beck Depression Inventory, 2
nd
 Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 
self-report questionnaire that assesses depressive symptoms such as sadness, worthlessness, and 
anhedonia. The measure is comprised of 21 items, each containing 4 statements that reflect 
differing levels of depressive symptoms. Respondents indicate which of the 4 statements best 
captures their experiences over the preceding two weeks. Higher scores indicate greater 
depressive symptoms. The BDI-II demonstrates evidence of content, discriminant, and factorial 
validity (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
Treatment Integrity 
 We assessed the extent to which the therapist adhered to the treatment protocol via audio 
recordings of treatment sessions. All treatment sessions were recorded. Two participants 
(28.57% of the sample) were randomly selected to have all 12 of their treatment sessions coded. 
One participant was randomly selected from the first half of the sample and the second 
participant was randomly selected from the second half of the sample, to control for the effects 
of therapist practice and therapist drift. A trained independent assessor coded each treatment 
session from the two participants for both structure and content, timed in accordance with the 
therapist treatment manual. Across participants, treatment integrity reached 98.31% for structure 
and 99.38% for content. 
Results 
 We assessed treatment efficacy in terms of (1) remission rates, (2) effect size 
comparisons, (3) clinically significant change, and (4) end-state functioning. See Table 1 for 
sample means and standard deviations at pretreatment, posttreatment, and 6-month follow-up. 
Missing data were present on self-report questionnaires at 6-month follow-up for 1 participant, 
due to a technical error during data collection. The data were imputed using the last available 
observation point, as this provided more conservative estimates of treatment outcome overall 
than did removing the participant from relevant analyses (see Table 2). Results from the 






Sample Means and Standard Deviations at Pretreatment, Posttreatment, and 6-Month Follow-up 
Measure Pretreatment Posttreatment 6-month 
 M SD M SD M SD 
ADIS-IV 5.5 0.82 3.14 1.03 2.43 1.90  
WAQ 38.36 5.25 24.36 9.06 25.43 6.42  
IUS 85.71 14.71 55.00 15.55 54.29 12.30 
PSWQ 61.57 6.00 50.00 8.25 51.14 6.15 
GAD-SBQ 47.00 9.95 32.71 5.53 36.14 5.11 
BAI 23.71 10.47 9.86 10.56 12.57 12.12 
BDI-II 14.71 4.39 4.00 5.69 5.57 5.16 
Note. ADIS = Clinical Severity Rating of the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-
IV; WAQ = Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; PSWQ = 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GAD-SBQ = Generalized Anxiety Disorder-Safety Behaviour 
Questionnaire; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; and BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory, 2
nd
 




Effect Sizes (Cohen’s d) for GAD Symptoms and IU 
Comparison Measure 
 ADIS-IV WAQ IUS PSWQ GAD-SBQ BAI BDI-II 
Pre – Post  2.06 1.32 1.72 1.13 1.41 1.64 2.08 
Pre – 3-month  1.94 1.07 1.14 0.89 1.34 1.25 0.53 
Pre – 6-month  1.34 1.29 1.66 1.06 1.65 1.47 2.15 
Post – 3-month  0.94 0.00 -0.15 -0.27 -0.60 -0.41 -0.50 
Post – 6-month 0.37 -0.15 0.07 -0.18 -0.70 -0.56 -0.55 
Note. “Pre – Post” = Cohen’s d effect sizes between pretreatment and posttreatment; “Pre – 3-
month” = Cohen’s d effect sizes between pretreatment and 3-month follow-up; “Pre – 6-month” 
= Cohen’s d effect sizes between pretreatment and 6-month follow-up; “Post – 3-month” = 
Cohen’s d effect sizes between posttreatment and 3-month follow-up; “Post – 6-month” = 
Cohen’s d effect sizes between posttreatment and 6-month follow-up; ADIS = Clinical Severity 
Rating of the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV; WAQ = Worry and Anxiety 
Questionnaire; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire; GAD-SBQ = Generalized Anxiety Disorder-Safety Behaviour Questionnaire; 







Effect Sizes (Cohen’s d) for GAD Symptoms and IU (Completers Sample) 
Comparison Measure 
 ADIS-IV WAQ IUS PSWQ GAD-SBQ  BAI BDI-II 
Pre – Post  2.06 1.32 1.72 1.13 1.41 1.64 2.08 
Pre – 3-month  1.94 1.07 1.14 0.89 1.34 1.25 0.53 
Pre – 6-month  1.34 2.07* 1.51* 1.82* 1.29* 1.92* 2.33* 
Post – 3-month  0.94 0.00 -0.15 -0.27 -0.60 -0.41 -0.50 
Post – 6-month 0.37 -0.18* -0.11* -0.10* 0.10* -0.50* -1.04* 
Note. N = 7 unless otherwise noted. “Pre – Post” = Cohen’s d effect sizes between pretreatment 
and posttreatment; “Pre – 3-month” = Cohen’s d effect sizes between pretreatment and 3-month 
follow-up; “Pre – 6-month” = Cohen’s d effect sizes between pretreatment and 6-month follow-
up; “Post – 3-month” = Cohen’s d effect sizes between posttreatment and 3-month follow-up; 
“Post – 6-month” = Cohen’s d effect sizes between posttreatment and 6-month follow-up; ADIS 
= Clinical Severity Rating of the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV; WAQ = 
Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; PSWQ = Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; GAD-SBQ = Generalized Anxiety Disorder-Safety Behaviour 








A participant was considered to have achieved GAD remission if they had a score of less than 4 
on the ADIS-IV’s CSR. At posttreatment, six out of seven participants had remitted from GAD. 
This was relatively consistent across the follow-up period: at both 3- and 6-month follow-up, 
five participants maintained GAD remission on the ADIS-IV. 
Mean Comparisons 
 We calculated effect sizes (Cohen’s d) to assess the relative magnitude of change 
between assessment points (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations). To evaluate the 
short- and long-term effects of treatment on participants’ GAD symptoms and underlying 
cognitive variables, we examined the effect sizes between pre- and posttreatment and between 
pretreatment and 6-month follow-up. We also calculated effect sizes between pretreatment and 
3-month follow-up and between posttreatment and the follow-up points (see Table 2). Paired 
samples t-tests were used to evaluate the statistical significance of key comparisons (i.e., pre- to 
posttreatment, pretreatment to 6-month follow-up, and posttreatment to 6-month follow-up). 
 Pretreatment to subsequent time points. Across all measures, the general pattern of 
results indicated substantial reductions from pre- to posttreatment. All measures demonstrated 
large, positive effect sizes from pre- to posttreatment. Paired samples t-tests showed that these 
comparisons were statistically significant across all measures. When examining the entire study 
period, all measures demonstrated large, positive effect sizes from pretreatment to 6-month 
follow-up. Paired samples t-tests demonstrated statistical significance for each comparison, with 
the exception of a trend toward statistical significance for the GAD-SBQ. 
 Posttreatment to follow-up. From posttreatment to 6-month follow-up, the general 
pattern of results indicated no statistically significant change across measures. Paired samples t-
tests were non-significant for all comparisons. Effect sizes were of negligible size for the WAQ, 
PSWQ, and IUS. We found a small, positive effect size for the ADIS-IV, suggesting small, 
continued improvement in overall GAD symptomatology. The BAI, BDI-II, and GAD-SBQ 
demonstrated moderate, negative effect sizes over this time period. 
Clinically Significant Change 
 We assessed clinically significant change on all study variables. For the ADIS-IV, CSR 
scores below 4 were considered to be clinically significant. On the PSWQ, BAI, and BDI-II, 
clinically significant change was calculated by determining if a participant’s posttreatment score 
was closer to the functional group mean than to the dysfunctional group mean (Jacobson & 
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Truax, 1991). In this case, the dysfunctional group was defined as the GAD clinical population 
and the functional group was defined as the non-clinical population. If a participant’s score fell 
below the cut score derived using this formula (c = SD0M1 + SD1M0 / SD0 + SD1), they were 
considered to be closer to the functional population than to the dysfunctional population. Due to 
the lack of non-clinical norms available for the GAD-SBQ and French non-clinical norms for the 
WAQ, we used an alternative formula  (a = M1 – 2SD1; Jacobson & Truax, 1991). Thus, 
clinically significant change on the WAQ and GAD-SBQ was said to have occurred if a 
participant’s score fell at least 2 standard deviations below the pretreatment sample mean. This 
provides a conservative estimate of clinically significant change. 
Clinically significant change varied considerably across outcome measures (see Table 4). 
At posttreatment, six participants demonstrated clinically significant change on clinician-rated 
GAD symptoms (ADIS-IV) versus five participants in self-rated GAD symptoms (WAQ). Four 
participants experienced clinically significant change on the PSWQ, in contrast to only one on 
the GAD-SBQ. Three of seven participants experienced clinically significant change on the IUS. 
The majority of participants demonstrated clinically significant change on the BDI-II (6/7) and 
BAI (5/7). 
Clinically significant change was generally maintained across the follow-up period. On 
the ADIS, clinically significant change decreased slightly across follow-up (5/7 participants at 
both time points). On the WAQ, clinically significant change decreased slightly at 3-month 
follow-up (4/7 participants) but returned to posttreatment levels (5/7 participants) by 6-month 
follow-up. Clinically significant change on the PSWQ increased to five participants by 3-month 
follow-up and remained unchanged at 6-month follow-up. Similarly, the rate of clinically 
significant change on the IUS increased by one participant at 3-month follow-up and was 
maintained at 6-month follow-up. Five and four participants demonstrated clinically significant 
change on the BDI-II and BAI, respectively, at both follow-up points. The rate of clinically 
significant change on the GAD-SBQ remained low across follow-up. 
End-State Functioning 
 End-state functioning was calculated based on the number of measures on which a given 
participant experienced clinically significant change (see Table 5). This calculation was based on 





Clinically Significant Change Across Measures 
Measure Time Point 
 Post-Tx 3-month 6-month 
ADIS-IV 6/7 5/7 5/7 
WAQ 5/7 4/7 5/7 
IUS 3/7 4/7 4/7 
PSWQ 4/7 5/7 5/7 
GAD-SBQ 1/7 1/7 0/7 
BAI 5/7 4/7 4/7 
BDI-II 6/7 5/7 5/7 
Note. “Post-Tx” = number of participants who achieved clinically significant change at 
posttreatment; “3-month” = number of participants who achieved clinically significant change at 
3-month follow-up; “6-month” = number of participants who achieved clinically significant 
change at 6-month follow-up; ADIS = Clinical Severity Rating of the Anxiety Disorders 
Interview Schedule for DSM-IV; WAQ = Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire; IUS = Intolerance 
of Uncertainty Scale; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GAD-SBQ = Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder-Safety Behaviour Questionnaire; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; and BDI-II = 







End-State Functioning Across Participants 
Participant Time Point 
 Post-Tx 3-month 6-month 
901 4/6 5/6 5/6 
902 6/6 6/6 6/6 
903 5/6 6/6 6/6 
904 4/6 6/6 3/6 
905 3/6 1/6 3/6 
906 0/6 0/6 0/6 
907 6/6 3/6 5/6 
Note. End-state functioning was calculated as the total number of the following measures on 
which a participant achieved clinically significant change at a given time point: Anxiety 
Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV, Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire, Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire, Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, Beck Anxiety Inventory, and Beck Depression 
Inventory, 2
nd




not included, as this measure has not yet been validated in clinical or non-clinical populations. 
Low end-state functioning was defined as clinically significant change on 0-2 measures. 
Moderate end-state functioning was defined as clinically significant change on 3-4 measures. 
Finally, high end-state functioning was defined as clinically significant change on 5-6 measures. 
These criteria are consistent with previous investigations involving CBT for GAD (e.g., Dugas & 
Ladouceur, 2000). 
 Using this formula, the majority of participants (6/7) displayed moderate to high end-
state functioning at posttreatment. Three participants each experienced moderate and high end-
state functioning, respectively. The majority of participants continued to experience moderate to 
high end-state functioning across the follow-up period. At 3-month follow-up, four participants 
displayed high end-state functioning and one participant had moderate end-state functioning. At 
6-month follow-up, four participants displayed high end-state functioning and two had moderate 
end-state functioning. The remaining participants demonstrated low end-state functioning. 
Discussion 
 The main goal of this study was to conduct a preliminary evaluation of a novel, IU-
focused CBT protocol for GAD. The results supported our hypothesis that GAD symptoms 
would be significantly reduced by posttreatment: six of seven participants achieved GAD 
remission by posttreatment, as assessed by a structured clinical interview. Moreover, we found 
substantial pre- to posttreatment decreases in self-reported GAD symptomatology, general 
psychopathology, and IU. The magnitudes of these changes were large and statistically 
significant for all measures. This suggests that our IU-focused protocol does indeed target IU and 
produces meaningful change in GAD symptoms by posttreatment. Treatment gains were 
generally maintained across the 6-month follow-up period, with moderate deterioration in safety 
behaviours as well as general anxiety and depressive symptoms. However, these deteriorations 
were not statistically significant when evaluated in paired samples t-tests. Moreover, the relative 
magnitude of change for the overall study period (i.e., from pretreatment to 6-month follow-up) 
remained large and positive across all outcome measures. The majority of participants achieved 
clinically significant change on all measures by posttreatment, with the exception of the GAD-
SBQ. Our findings regarding safety behaviours should be interpreted with some caution, given 
the unvalidated nature of the measure and the conservative cut-off used for clinically significant 
change (Jacobson & Truax, 1991). Our hypothesis that the majority of participants would 
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experience moderate to high end-state functioning from posttreatment to 6-month follow-up was 
also confirmed. Overall, our results suggest that this novel, streamlined CBT protocol produces 
meaningful change in key symptom dimensions and beliefs about uncertainty by posttreatment 
and that these changes are relatively maintained 6 months later. 
Our pattern of results is largely consistent with previous investigations of a more 
complex IU-focused treatment for GAD (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Dugas et al., 2010; Dugas 
et al., 2003; Ladouceur et al., 2000a; van der Heiden et al., 2012). These findings are particularly 
encouraging, given that the novel CBT protocol was delivered in fewer sessions, with fewer 
components, and only one major cognitive-behavioural intervention. Our findings suggest that 
we can significantly reduce GAD symptoms by exclusively targeting IU via behavioural 
experiments. Moreover, we achieved greater reductions in IU relative to previous investigations 
using the standard CBT-IU protocol. For instance, although large pre-posttreatment effect sizes 
for the IUS were found in previous studies (d = 0.93, Donegan & Dugas, 2013; d = 1.01, Dugas 
et al., 2010), these are smaller in comparison to our pre-posttreatment effect size (d = 1.72). It is 
also of note that this pre-posttreatment time period was not identical across studies: the current 
CBT protocol is two sessions shorter than the standard CBT protocol (12 vs. 14 sessions). Thus, 
we achieved a larger reduction in IU in fewer treatment sessions. However, despite these 
promising results we cannot draw any conclusions regarding the relative efficacy of our novel 
CBT protocol and the standard CBT-IU protocol based on our limited sample size and study 
design. 
Our findings suggest that behavioural experiments targeting beliefs about uncertainty can 
produce meaningful changes in both IU and GAD symptoms. This is consistent with cognitive 
mediation theories of anxiety, which suggest that changing underlying beliefs will lead to 
changes in anxiety symptoms. Behavioural experiments target underlying beliefs to reduce 
problematic anxiety symptoms. In the current treatment, behavioural experiments were 
specifically designed to target the catastrophically negative beliefs about uncertainty that we 
propose lead to GAD symptoms (see Figure 2). The finding that IU-focused behavioural 
experiments decreased GAD symptoms thus indirectly supports our conceptual model.  
This study had a number of strengths. First, the clinical case replication series design 
allowed us to conduct a small-scale evaluation of a novel protocol. This is an economical use of 
research and clinical resources, allowing us to determine if the treatment protocol warranted 
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further investigation in a randomized controlled trial. Second, we evaluated treatment outcome 
using a variety of methods, including remission rates, effect sizes, clinically significant change 
calculations, and mean comparisons. Third, we evaluated treatment outcome using a variety of 
clinician-administered and self-report measures for GAD symptomatology, general 
psychopathology, and IU. Fourth, we included a significant follow-up period in order to assess 
both short- and long-term treatment outcome. Fifth, we permitted comorbidity to enhance the 
representativeness of our sample. Sixth, our treatment protocol’s focus on behavioural 
experiments reduces the need for future dismantling studies that would compare the relative 
contributions of multiple cognitive-behavioural techniques. This also resulted in a parsimonious 
and efficient treatment protocol, and may improve knowledge translation to clinicians (Cougle, 
2012; Dimeff et al., 2009; Mansell, 2008; Shafran et al., 2009). This may be particularly 
important given the low rates of evidence-based psychological treatments in routine clinical 
settings (e.g., Goisman, Warsaw, & Keller, 1999; Stein et al., 2004). Our study also had several 
important limitations. First, our small sample size limited the number and type of statistical 
analyses that could be performed due to low power. Second, it is unclear how our results would 
generalize outside of our sample’s geographic and demographic boundaries. Third, we did not 
employ a waitlist control condition. Thus, we cannot be certain that our results are not 
attributable to the effect of time. However, this is less of a concern for a preliminary 
investigation in a GAD sample, given that spontaneous remission in GAD is uncommon 
(Yonkers, Warshaw, Massion, & Keller, 1996). Fourth, the safety behaviours measure developed 
for this study has not yet been validated. Although it assesses a wide variety of safety behaviours 
that may exist in GAD (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007), the validity and reliability of this measure’s 
results should be interpreted with caution.  
Implications and Conclusions 
 IU has been conceptualized as a key factor in the development and maintenance of GAD 
symptoms. In this study, we found preliminary evidence suggesting that GAD symptoms can be 
reduced by directly and exclusively targeting IU via behavioural experiments. Behavioural 
experiments may reduce intolerance of uncertainty, and thus reduce GAD symptoms, in several 
ways. First, behavioural experiments may weaken catastrophically negative beliefs about 
uncertainty. A behavioural experiment may reveal disconfirmatory information about a 
previously held belief about uncertainty, thereby reducing IU. Second, behavioural experiments 
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may foster the creation of neutral or positive beliefs about uncertainty. These new neutral or 
positive beliefs about uncertainty may therefore also reduce IU. Behavioural experiments may be 
particularly valuable in selectively weakening or strengthening specific beliefs about uncertainty, 
as they may work on both implicational and propositional levels of cognition (Teasdale, 1997; 
Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) via experiential learning and reflection (Bennett-Levy et al., 2005; 
Kolb, 1984; Lewin, 1946). Future research should compare the relative performance of 
behavioural experiments, behavioural exposure, and other methods of targeting IU. 
 Overall, our study provides preliminary evidence that a novel CBT protocol targeting IU 
via behavioural experiments can produce significant reductions in GAD symptomatology. The 
remission rates and relative magnitude of changes on measures of GAD and general 
psychopathology were generally comparable to outcomes achieved via the standard CBT-IU 
protocol. We were also able to achieve greater reductions in IU than in previous investigations of 
the standard CBT-IU protocol. This suggests that our novel protocol does indeed target IU. Our 
pattern of findings is particularly encouraging as this novel CBT protocol appears to be more 






The current program of research focused on the development and preliminary evaluation 
of a novel CBT protocol that targets IU via behavioural experiments. In the first study, we 
examined short- and long-term treatment efficacy in terms of remission rates, effect sizes, 
clinically significant change, and end-state functioning. These analyses focused on change over 
time in GAD symptoms, general psychopathology, and IU. This provided us with information 
about how participants functioned in a variety of symptom domains at specific time points, such 
as posttreatment and across the 6-month follow-up period. We found that 85.71% of participants 
achieved GAD remission by posttreatment, which was maintained by 71.43% of participants 
across the 6-month follow-up period. The majority of participants (85.71%) had moderate to 
high end-state functioning at post-treatment and at 6-month follow-up. Effect sizes during the 
active treatment period as well as across the entire study period were large and positive for all 
measures of treatment outcome. Overall, our findings provided preliminary support for the 
efficacy of this treatment protocol. 
The linear analytic strategy of our first study assumed that change in the outcome 
variables of interest occurs in a gradual fashion during therapy (Hayes, Laurenceau, Feldman, 
Strauss, & Cardaciotto, 2007). In our second study, we evaluated non-linear change during the 
treatment protocol’s 12 therapy sessions using sudden gains. Sudden gains refer to rapid, large 
changes in a given variable between two therapy sessions (Tang & DeRubeis, 1999). We 
considered sudden gains in IU, worry, and safety behaviours and investigated their relative 






Sudden Gains in Generalized Anxiety Disorder: Changing Beliefs to Change Symptoms 
Psychological treatments are improved by evaluating not only if a given treatment works, 
but also how that treatment works. Cognitive-behavioural mediation theories posit that changes 
in cognitive mechanisms precede changes in symptoms of emotional disorders, such as 
depression and anxiety. Specific modules or sessions within treatment may be particularly 
relevant to changes in these underlying cognitive mechanisms or symptoms. Sudden gains, or 
rapid changes that occur between two treatment sessions, provide key information about this 
temporal sequence of change on an individual, non-linear level (Present et al., 2008; Tang & 
DeRubeis, 1999). Examinations of sudden gains may also pinpoint key modules or sessions 
responsible for rapid change. Here, we consider sudden gains in intolerance of uncertainty (IU), 
excessive worry, and safety behaviours within a streamlined cognitive-behavioural treatment for 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) based on behavioural experiments. 
Psychological treatments are most commonly evaluated in terms of pre-posttreatment 
changes in psychopathology symptoms. However, symptom change is not always a linear 
process (Hayes, Laurenceau, Feldman, Strauss, & Cardaciotto, 2007; Present et al., 2008). 
Sudden gains are common, occurring in 14.60-52.20% of treatments for anxiety and depression 
(Aderka, Nickerson, Bøe, & Hofmann, 2012). These sudden gains also account for a large 
proportion of total change across treatment (e.g., 64.68%, Norton, Klenck, & Barrera, 2010; 
75%, Present et al., 2008; 105%, Stiles et al., 2003). Sudden gains do not appear to be random 
variations across treatment sessions. In fact, they have been associated with more positive 
treatment outcomes. For example, those who experience sudden gains during CBT for GAD 
experience greater pre-posttreatment reductions in excessive worry and self-rated GAD 
symptoms than those with no sudden gains (Deschênes & Dugas, 2013). Non-linear change that 
occurs early in treatment may be particularly relevant to short- and long-term outcomes. Several 
studies have found that the majority of sudden gains occur early in the treatment of depression 
(Kelly, Roberts, & Ciesla, 2005), panic disorder (Clerkin, Teachman, & Smith-Janick, 2008), 
and mixed emotional disorders (Stiles et al., 2003). Rapid early response in cognitive therapy 
accounts for 60-80% of total symptom reduction (Ilardi & Craighead, 1994). Moreover, 
individuals who experience sudden gains early in treatment have been shown to have higher 
posttreatment remission rates (Busch, Kanter, Landes, & Kohlenberg, 2006), as well as lower 
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posttreatment symptom severity and greater clinically significant change on measures of general 
psychopathology (Stiles et al., 2003) and depression (Busch et al., 2006; Kelly et al., 2005). 
Consistent with cognitive mediation theories, shifts in cognition may prompt these early sudden 
gains, precipitating further symptom change during treatment (Kelly et al., 2005; Tang & 
DeRubeis, 1999). Thus, we were particularly interested in determining the relevance of early 
sudden gains in the treatment of GAD. 
Individuals with a primary diagnosis of GAD appear to experience sudden gains in both 
worry (20.34% of sample; Deschênes & Dugas, 2013) and general anxiety symptoms (16.8% of 
sample; Present et al., 2008). Sudden gains in GAD occur across of a variety of psychological 
treatments, including individual GAD supportive-expressive therapy (Present et al., 2008), 
individual GAD cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT; Deschênes & Dugas, 2013) and 
transdiagnostic group CBT (Norton et al., 2010). However, the temporal sequence of sudden 
gains in underlying cognitive mechanisms, worry, and safety behaviours has not been examined. 
 Our research group has previously evaluated sudden gains in our standard CBT protocol 
for GAD (Deschênes & Dugas, 2013), which targets IU, positive beliefs about worry, cognitive 
avoidance, and negative problem orientation. In the present study, we turn our attention to 
sudden gains within a novel, streamlined CBT protocol exclusively targeting IU. Evaluating 
sudden gains within this streamlined CBT protocol offered several advantages. First, our novel 
CBT protocol solely targeted IU, rather than the additional cognitive mechanisms targeted by our 
standard CBT protocol (i.e., positive beliefs about worry, cognitive avoidance, and negative 
problem orientation). Thus, changes in GAD symptoms are more likely to be associated with 
changes in IU. Second, our novel CBT protocol employed one major treatment component (i.e., 
behavioural experiments targeting beliefs about uncertainty) versus the standard protocol’s four 
major components. This allowed us to more accurately pinpoint key therapeutic interventions 
without the need for future dismantling studies. This increases treatment efficiency and 
parsimony, both of which may enhance later knowledge translation to clinicians (Cougle, 2012; 
Mansell, 2008). This also extends the extant literature, as few studies isolate the “active 
ingredients” of therapy (Longmore & Worrell, 2007). Moreover, behavioural experiments are 
designed to directly target idiosyncratic beliefs, and may therefore be more likely to produce 
sudden gains in these beliefs than exposure-based interventions (e.g., Raes, Koster, Loeys, & De 
Raedt, 2011) commonly used in GAD treatments. Third, we included weekly assessments of IU 
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and GAD-related safety behaviours in addition to worry. This allowed us to determine the 
temporal sequence of change among a key cognitive mechanism (i.e., IU), the hallmark feature 
of GAD (i.e., excessive and uncontrollable worry), and behavioural symptoms associated with 
GAD. Because our treatment protocol solely targets IU, we expected sudden gains in IU to be 
more common than sudden gains in worry or safety behaviours. Finally, given the potential 
importance of early sudden gains, we used the modified sudden gain criterion outlined by Kelly 
and colleagues (2005) to evaluate sudden gains that occur early or late in treatment. 
The main objectives of this study were to investigate the relative proportion, sequence, 
and relationship to treatment efficacy of sudden gains in a streamlined CBT protocol for GAD. 
Specifically, we hypothesized that (1) more sudden gains would occur in IU than in worry or 
safety behaviours; (2) sudden gains in IU would precede sudden gains in worry or safety 
behaviours, and (3) early sudden gains would be associated with more positive short- and long-
term treatment outcome. 
Method 
Participants 
 The sample consisted of seven Francophone participants (five women) with a primary 
diagnosis of GAD. A primary diagnosis of GAD consisted of a score of 4 or greater on the 
Clinician’s Severity Rating of the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS), 
with no other clinical diagnosis having a greater score. All participants self-identified as White 
or of European descent, and had a mean age of 47.29 (SD = 12.31). The sample’s mean GAD 
severity rating was 5.5 (SD = 0.82) with an average GAD duration of 20.37 years (SD = 19.00). 
The majority of the sample (57.10%) had no prior therapy experience and denied use of 
anxiolytics. The same percentage of participants endorsed current use of antidepressants. 
Measures of Sudden Gains 
 The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale – Past Week (IUS-PW; Dugas, 2008) is a 12-item 
questionnaire that assesses the tendency to view uncertainty and its consequences as negative 
over a one-week period (see Appendix E). The questionnaire was adapted from the Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994b), which has 
demonstrated strong validity and test-retest reliability. Items on the IUS-PW are rated on a 5-
point Likert scale, with higher scores representing elevated IU. 
 33 
 
 The 3-Item Penn State Worry Questionnaire – Past Week (PSWQ-PW; Stöber & 
Bittencourt, 1998) is a brief questionnaire that assesses the tendency to worry excessively and 
uncontrollably over a one-week period. The 3-item version was adapted from the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire – Past Week (Stöber & Bittencourt, 1998) and an abbreviated version of 
the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Berle et al., 2011). Items on the PSWQ-PW are rated on a 
5-point Likert scale, with higher scores representing greater worry. The PSWQ-PW has 
demonstrated strong validity and reliability for weekly assessments of excessive worry (Stöber & 
Bittencourt, 1998).  
 The Generalized Anxiety Disorder-Safety Behaviours Questionnaire – Past Week (GAD-
SBQ-PW; Hebert & Dugas, 2013) is an 18-item questionnaire measuring the tendency to use a 
variety of safety behaviours associated with generalized anxiety disorder during the previous 
week (see Appendix F). Safety behaviours include avoidance of uncertainty-inducing situations, 
over-preparation, reassurance-seeking, and refusal to delegate tasks. This measure was adapted 
for use in this study from the Generalized Anxiety Disorder – Safety Behaviours Questionnaire, 
which assesses safety behaviours over the previous one-month period. Each item is rated on a 5-
point Likert scale. These item scores are summed to create the total score, with higher scores 
corresponding to greater past-week use of safety behaviours. 
Treatment Outcome Measures 
The Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Di Nardo, Brown, & 
Barlow, 1994) is a semi-structured clinical interview assessing anxiety, depression, psychosis, 
and related disorders. The Clinician’s Severity Rating (CSR) provides a numerical rating for the 
severity of each diagnosed condition on a 9-point Likert scale. CSR scores range from 0 (“absent 
or none”) to 8 (“very severe”), with scores of 4 or greater considered clinically significant. The 
ADIS-IV has demonstrated good inter-rater reliability for dimensional ratings of GAD (clinical 
severity rating r = .72, excessive worry r = .73, uncontrollable worry r = .78) as well as GAD 
diagnostic criteria ( = .67; Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001). 
The Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (WAQ; Dugas et al., 2001) evaluates self-reported 
GAD diagnostic criteria. Participants rate each item on an 8-point Likert scale, with greater 
scores representing greater GAD symptoms. The French translation of the WAQ demonstrates 
adequate test-retest reliability over 64 days (r = .83 for non-GAD; r = .75 for GAD). 
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 The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990) is a 16-item measure assessing the self-reported tendency to worry excessively and 
uncontrollably. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale, with greater scores representing greater 
worry. The French translation of the PSWQ has excellent test-retest reliability over a four-week 
period (r = .86; Gosselin, Dugas, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 2001). 
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston et al., 1994b) is a 27-item measure 
of the tendency to view uncertainty and its consequences in a negative manner. Each item is 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale, with greater scores corresponding to greater IU. The 
questionnaire demonstrates strong test-retest reliability and a stable two-factor structure (Sexton 
& Dugas, 2009). 
 The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988; French 
translation: Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, Gagnon, & Rhéaume, 1994a) is a 21-item self-
report measure assessing cognitive, somatic, and affective anxiety symptoms over a one-week 
period. The French version of the BAI has good internal consistency (α = .93) and adequate test-
retest reliability (r = 0.63). It has also demonstrated convergent, divergent, and factorial validity.  
 The Beck Depression Inventory, 2
nd
 Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 
self-report measure of depressive symptoms such as sadness, worthlessness, and anhedonia. The 
measure has 21 items with 4 statements each. These statements reflect varying levels of 
depressive symptoms and respondents indicate which statement best captures their experiences 
from the previous two weeks. Higher scores represent greater depressive symptom severity. The 
BDI-II has shown discriminant, content, and factorial validity (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
Criteria for Sudden Gains 
 Sudden gains on the IUS-PW, PSWQ-PW, and GAD-SBQ-PW were assessed using the 
criteria outlined by Deschênes and Dugas (2013), adapted from Tang and DeRubeis (1999). The 
criteria for a sudden gain focus on both the absolute and relative magnitudes of the gain. A 
sudden gain was identified if the following three criteria were met. Criterion 1 requires that 
absolute magnitude of the gain be large. Consistent with previous studies in anxiety disorders 
(e.g., Clerkin et al., 2008; Deschênes & Dugas, 2013), we assessed absolute magnitude using the 
Reliable Change Index (RCI; Jacobson & Truax, 1991). We calculated the RCI of each 
respective measure by dividing the mean pre- to posttreatment change score across participants 
by the standard error of the difference score. In order to meet this first criterion, the minimum 
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decrease required between two sessions was 2.63 for the IUS-PW, 3.87 for the PSWQ-PW, and 
1.02 for the GAD-SBQ-PW, respectively. Criterion 2 requires that the relative magnitude of the 
gain be large. Consistent with Deschênes and Dugas, we defined this as a 25% or greater 
reduction in scores from the pre-gain session. Criterion 3 requires that the gain be large relative 
to fluctuations preceding and following the gain. We required that the gain be at least 1.5 SD 
relative to each individual’s mean score across all treatment sessions, as advised by Kelly and 
colleagues (2005). This modification of the original criterion defined by Tang and DeRubeis 
accounts for individual variability and allows sudden gains to be identified early in treatment. A 
sudden gain reversal constituted a loss of 50% or more of the original gain at any subsequent 
session (Tang & DeRubeis, 1999). 
Procedure 
 Concordia University and the Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal provided ethical 
approval for the study. Participants were recruited via advertisements placed in a local 
newspaper (see Appendix A). Interested individuals contacted our clinic and underwent telephone 
screening after providing informed consent (see Appendix B). After initial screening for the 
presence of GAD and high IU, retained individuals completed two diagnostic interviews. A 
licensed clinical psychologist conducted the ADIS and a team psychiatrist conducted the MINI. 
The final diagnosis was confirmed at a team meeting following a discussion of the diagnostic 
interview results. Participants were included in the study if they met the following criteria: (1) 
primary diagnosis of GAD with a minimum severity of 4 on the ADIS; (2) elevated intolerance 
of uncertainty, defined as an IUS score of 58 or greater (Koerner & Dugas, 2008); (3) 18 years of 
age or over; (4) fluent in French; (5) no current suicidal ideation; (6) no current or past history of 
psychosis or bipolar depression; (7) no current substance abuse or dependence; (8) no change in 
psychoactive mediation dose or type 12 weeks prior to the initial assessment; (9) willingness to 
maintain stable dose and type of psychoactive medication during the treatment phase of the 
study; and (10) no concurrent psychological treatment for anxiety or depression. Participants 
provided informed consent for treatment following their enrollment in the study (see Appendix 
C). Potential participants who did not meet these inclusion criteria were provided with alternative 
services at the Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal or referred to an appropriate treatment source. 
 Treatment consisted of a novel cognitive-behavioural treatment (CBT) targeting 
intolerance of uncertainty exclusively via behavioural experiments. Treatment was composed of 
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three modules: (1) psychoeducation and uncertainty awareness training, (2) testing beliefs about 
uncertainty through behavioural experiments, and (3) relapse prevention. Each participant 
completed 12 weekly, 50-minute therapy sessions with a licensed clinical psychologist trained in 
this protocol. The study authors (E.A.H. and M.J.D.) conducted weekly clinical supervision to 
ensure treatment integrity. Participants completed the PSWQ-PW, IUS-PW, and GAD-SBQ-PW 
prior to each therapy session. Participants completed all treatment outcome measures (i.e., ADIS, 
PSWQ, WAQ, BAI, BDI-II) at pre-, mid-, and posttreatment and at 3- and 6-month follow-up. 
For the purposes of this study, we have focused on pretreatment, posttreatment, and 6-month 
follow-up scores on these measures.  
Results 
Total scores for the IUS-PW, PSWQ-PW, and GAD-SBQ-PW were calculated for each 
participant at each treatment session. Missing items for past-week measures were handled with 
mean substitution, given that they composed only 1.19% of the data (Deschênes & Dugas, 2013; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Missing treatment outcome data were present for one participant at 
6-month follow-up. Data were imputed using the last available assessment point, as this provided 
more conservative estimates of treatment outcome than did removal of the participant. 
Sudden Gains Across Measures 
 Across all measures (IUS-PW, PSWQ-PW, and GAD-SBQ-PW), a total of 21 sudden 
gains were identified. Six participants (85.71%) experienced at least one sudden gain over the 
course of treatment. Of these six participants, all experienced two or more sudden gains across 
all measures. 
IUS-PW. Over the course of treatment, six participants experienced at least one sudden 
gain on the IUS-PW. Ten sudden gains in total were identified on the IUS-PW, with two 
participants experiencing two sudden gains and one participant experiencing three. Five of the 
ten sudden gains found in our sample were reversed (50%). An equivalent number of IUS-PW 
sudden gains occurred during the first and second halves of treatment. Two sudden gains 
occurred at session 5, two occurred at session 7, and one occurred at sessions 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 
11, respectively. The average sudden gain magnitude (M = 13.70) on the IUS was substantially 
larger than the average pre-posttreatment change (M = 9.00). In other words, the average sudden 
gain magnitude accounted for 152.22% of the average pre-posttreatment change on this measure. 
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PSWQ-PW. Five participants experienced at least one sudden gain on the PSWQ-PW 
during treatment. Six sudden gains were identified on the PSWQ-PW, with one participant 
experiencing two sudden gains. Two of the six sudden gains on this measure (33.33%) were 
reversed at some point in treatment. The majority (66.67%) of PSWQ-PW sudden gains occurred 
within the first half of treatment. Two sudden gains occurred at Session 6 and one occurred at 
sessions 2, 4, 8, and 11, respectively. The average sudden gain magnitude accounted for 
186.67% of the pre-posttreatment change in PSWQ-PW scores. 
GAD-SBQ-PW. Three participants experienced at least one sudden gain on the GAD-
SBQ-PW during treatment. A total of five sudden gains on the GAD-SBQ-PW were identified, 
with two participants experiencing two sudden gains. Two of the five sudden gains found in our 
sample were reversed (40%). The majority (60%) of GAD-SBQ-PW sudden gains occurred 
within the first half of treatment. One sudden gain occurred at sessions 3, 5, 6, 8, and 10, 
respectively. The average magnitude of sudden gains on this measure accounted for 119.32% of 
pre-posttreatment score changes. 
Temporal Sequence of Sudden Gains 
Of the 21 sudden gains that occurred in our sample across three measures (PSWQ-PW, 
IUS-PW, and GAD-SBQ-PW), the majority occurred in conjunction with at least one other 
sudden gain (see Table 6 for sequence of sudden gains by participants). Eight (8) sudden gains 
occurred on one measure in isolation at a given time point, whereas 13 sudden gains occurred at 
the same time as at least one other gain within the same participant. Across the three measures, 
six participants experienced at least two sudden gains; three participants experienced at least 
three sudden gains; two participants experienced at least five sudden gains; and one participant 
experienced seven sudden gains. 
First sudden gains. We examined first sudden gains, as these initial rapid changes are 
the first link in a chain of nonlinear changes. Which sudden gains came first? The majority of 
first sudden gains involved the IUS-PW (44.44%), followed by the PSWQ-PW (33.33%), and 
the GAD-SBQ-PW (22.22%). Like overall sudden gains in our sample, the majority of these first 
sudden gains occurred in conjunction with a sudden gain on another measure. This distinction 
made important differences in the likelihood of a subsequent sudden gain. If the first sudden gain 
occurred in combination with a sudden gain on another measure (6/9 first sudden gains), the 




Sequence of Sudden Gains Across Participants.  
Participant First Gain Second Gain Third Gain Fourth Gain 
901 PSWQ-PW IUS-PW GAD-SBQ-PW IUS-PW,  
    GAD-SBQ-PW 
902 IUS-PW, IUS-PW, IUS-PW, ---  
 GAD-SBW-PW PSWQ-PW PSWQ-PW  
  GAD-SBW-PW 
903 IUS-PW PSWQ-PW --- --- 
904 --- --- --- --- 
905 GAD-SBQ-PW IUS-PW --- --- 
906 IUS-PW, --- --- --- 
 PSWQ-PW 
907 IUS-PW, IUS-PW --- --- 
 PSWQ-PW 
Note. PSWQ-PW = Penn State Worry Questionnaire – Past Week; IUS-PW = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale – Past Week; and GAD-SBQ-PW = Generalized Anxiety Disorder Safety 
Behaviours Questionnaire – Past Week.  
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third sudden gain was 33.33%. First sudden gains that occurred in combination with another 
sudden gain were most likely to lead to second sudden gains on the IUS-PW (50%). They were 
equally likely to lead to second gains on the PSWQ-PW (25%) and the GAD-SBQ-PW (25%). In 
contrast, first sudden gains that occurred in isolation (3/9 first sudden gains) all lead to second 
sudden gains. The likelihood of a third sudden gain was 33.33%, as was the likelihood of a 
fourth sudden gain. These isolated first sudden gains were more likely to lead to second sudden 
gains on the IUS-PW (66.66%) than the PSWQ-PW (33.33%) or the GAD-SBQ-PW (0%). 
Sequence of sudden gains across measures. If the first sudden gain involved the IUS-
PW (4/9 first sudden gains), there was a 75% probability of a second sudden gain and a 25% 
probability of a third. When a subsequent sudden gain occurred, the likelihood that it would 
involve the IUS-PW or the PSWQ-PW was 42.86% for both measures, respectively. The 
likelihood of a subsequent sudden gain on the GAD-SBQ-PW was 14.28%. Thus, initial sudden 
gains on the IUS-PW tended to lead to subsequent gains on the IUS-PW or PSWQ-PW. 
If the first sudden gain involved the PSWQ-PW (3/9 first sudden gains), the probability 
of a second sudden gain was 66.67%, the probability of a third sudden gain was 33.33%, and the 
probability of a fourth sudden gain was 33.33%. When a subsequent sudden gain occurred, it was 
most likely to involve the IUS-PW (60.00%). The likelihood of a subsequent sudden gain on the 
GAD-SBQ-PW was 40.00%. Thus, initial sudden gains on the PSWQ-PW tended to lead to 
subsequent gains on the IUS-PW or GAD-SBQ-PW. 
If the first sudden gain involved the GAD-SBQ-PW (2/9 first sudden gains), the 
probability of a second sudden gain was 100% and the probability of a third sudden gain was 
50.00%. In other words, first sudden gains involving the GAD-SBQ-PW always lead to at least 
one subsequent sudden gain. When a subsequent sudden gain occurred, it was most likely to 
involve the IUS-PW (50%). The likelihood of subsequent sudden gains on the PSWQ-PW and 
GAD-SBQ-PW were 33.33% and 16.67%, respectively. Thus, first sudden gains involving the 
GAD-SBQ-PW were most likely to lead to subsequent sudden gains on the IUS-PW. 
Sudden Gains and Treatment Outcome 
 We did not compare sudden gainers to non-sudden gainers, as only one participant did 
not experience a sudden gain over the course of treatment. Due to the importance of early sudden 
gains to treatment outcome, we created two groups: (1) those who experienced at least one 
sudden gain in the first six sessions of treatment (Early Sudden Gainers, or ESG) and (2) those 
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who did not experience a sudden gain in the first half of treatment (No Early Gains, or NEG). At 
pretreatment, the ESG group (5 participants) did not significantly differ from the NEG group (2 
participants) on the severity of clinician- or self-rated GAD symptoms, worry, IU, general 
anxiety symptoms. The groups also did not significantly differ on age, sex, educational 
attainment, GAD duration, number of comorbid conditions, medication use, or previous 
treatment experience. However, the groups did significantly differ in pretreatment depression 
scores, with the NEG endorsing greater depressive symptoms on the BDI-II, F = .006, t = 3.243, 
p = .023. Due to our small sample size, we were not able to statistically control for this 
pretreatment difference. See Table 7 for pretreatment, posttreatment, and 6-month follow-up 
scores on treatment outcome variables. 
 Short-term treatment outcome. First, we evaluated group differences at post-treatment. 
GAD remission was calculated as scores below 4 on the ADIS. At posttreatment, the ESG had a 
100% remission rate whereas the NEG group had a 50% remission rate. We also assessed end-
state functioning, calculating the total number of treatment outcome measures on which a 
participant achieved clinically significant change (i.e., ADIS, WAQ, PSWQ, IUS, BAI, and BDI-
II). Low end-state functioning was defined as clinically significant change on 0-2 measures; 
moderate represented 3-4 measures; and high represented 5-6 measures. On average, the ESG 
group had moderate end-state functioning (M = 4.8, SD = 1.30) whereas the NEG group had low 
end-state functioning (M = 2.00, SD = 2.83). This difference was not statistically significant, as 
assessed by an independent samples t-test. The ESG and NEG groups significantly differed on 
post-treatment WAQ scores, with the ESG group having statistically significantly lower scores, 
F = .000, t = 2.818, p = .037. No significant group differences were found on the ADIS, PSWQ, 
BAI, or BDI-II. However, the ESG group had numerically lower scores than the NEG group on 
each of these measures. 
 Long-term treatment outcome. We then examined group differences at the last 
remaining follow-up point: 6-months post-treatment. Across all measures, the ESG group had 
numerically lower scores than the NEG group. At this time point, the ESG group had a 100% 
remission rate whereas the NEG group had a 0% remission rate – a statistically significant 
difference (χ = 7.00, p = .008; likelihood ratio = 8.38, p = .004). On average, the ESG group had 
high end-state functioning (M = 5.00, SD = 1.25) whereas the NEG group had low end-state 




Means and Standard Deviations for Early Sudden Gains and No Early Gains Groups 
Measure and Time ESG Group NEG Group 
 M SD M SD 
ADIS 
 Pretreatment 5.80 .57 4.75 1.06 
 Posttreatment 3.00 .61 3.50 2.12 
 6-month follow-up 1.60 1.52 4.50 .71 
WAQ 
 Pretreatment 38.00 5.43 39.25 6.72  
 Posttreatment 20.20 6.21 34.75 6.01 
 6-month follow-up 23.20 3.95 31.00 9.90 
PSWQ 
 Pretreatment 63.80 5.63 56.00 1.41 
 Posttreatment 48.40 9.29 54.00 4.24 
 6-month follow-up 48.4 4.39 58.00 4.24 
BAI 
 Pretreatment 20.00 10.17 33.00 1.41 
 Posttreatment 6.60 6.99 18.00 16.97 
 6-month follow-up 9.8 9.78 19.50 19.09 
BDI-II 
 Pretreatment 12.60 2.70 20.00 2.83 
 Posttreatment 1.2 1.30 11.00 7.07 
 6-month follow-up 2.8 2.49 12.5 .71 
Note. ESG = Early sudden gains group; NEG = No early gains group; ADIS = Clinical Severity 
Rating of the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV; WAQ = Worry and Anxiety 
Questionnaire for DSM-5; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; BAI = Beck Anxiety 
Inventory; and BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory, 2
nd




p = .034). The ESG and NEG groups differed significantly on PSWQ (F = .024, t = 2.630, p = 
.047) and BDI-II scores (F = 1.218, t = 5.154, p = .004). There was a trend toward significance 
on ADIS scores (F = 4.311, t = 2.489, p = .055), and no significant differences on WAQ or BAI 
scores. 
Discussion 
 The main goals of this study were to examine the relative proportion and sequence of 
sudden gains in IU, worry, and safety behaviours as well as the relationship between early 
sudden gains and treatment outcome. We found that sudden gains were the rule rather than the 
exception for participants who completed a novel, 12-week CBT protocol targeting IU. More 
specifically, 85.71% of participants experienced a sudden gain in IU, 71.43% in worry, and 
42.86% in safety behaviours. This is consistent with our expectation that the greatest number of 
sudden gains would occur in IU, given that our treatment solely targets this cognitive 
mechanism. Interestingly, our sample demonstrated a higher proportion of sudden gains than in 
previous investigations of generalized anxiety disorder (20.34%, Deschênes & Dugas, 2013; 
34.50%, Present et al., 2008) or in a recent meta-analysis of sudden gains in anxiety and 
depressive disorder treatments (14.60-52.20%, Aderka et al., 2012). The reversal rate for sudden 
gains in our study ranged from 33.33-50.00% across 3 measures, largely consistent with previous 
literature in GAD (54.00%, Deschênes & Dugas, 2013; 40.00%, Present et al., 2008) as well as 
anxiety and depression (9.10-85.70%, Aderka et al., 2012). It is possible that the novel CBT 
protocol used in the current study produces more sudden gains than other psychological 
treatments for GAD, although this cannot be conclusively established from our study design. 
 To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first investigation of the sequence 
of sudden gains in GAD symptoms and a cognitive mechanism (in this case, IU). We found that 
sudden gains were more likely to occur first in IU, rather than in worry or safety behaviours. 
These initial sudden gains in IU were most likely to lead to further sudden gains in IU and worry. 
This finding is relatively consistent with investigations of linear change demonstrating that 
reductions in IU precede reductions in excessive worry (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000). Thus, there 
is some evidence that rapid, non-linear changes in IU and GAD symptoms follow a sequence 
similar to linear changes in these same variables. The pattern of results is consistent with the 
temporal aspects of cognitive mediation theories, which suggest that changes in beliefs precede 
changes in symptoms. In this case, rapid changes in beliefs about uncertainty were more likely to 
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occur first than were changes in excessive worry and safety behaviours. Our findings also 
provide indirect support for the cognitive-behavioural model of IU on which this novel treatment 
protocol is based, which highlights the temporal precedence and clinical significance of 
catastrophically negative beliefs about uncertainty. 
 Early sudden gains had a unique relationship to treatment outcome in our sample, 
particularly long-term outcome. Remission rates at posttreatment and 6-month follow-up for 
early sudden gainers was 100%, as compared to those who did not experience sudden gains in 
the first six sessions (50% and 0% at posttreatment and 6-month follow-up, respectively). Early 
sudden gainers had higher average end-state functioning at both posttreatment and 6-month 
follow-up, with statistically significant between-group differences at 6-month follow-up. Early 
sudden gainers exhibited lower scores on all outcome measures at posttreatment and 6-month 
follow-up as compared to those with no early gains. Several of these differences were 
statistically significant at 6-month follow-up (i.e., excessive worry, depressive symptoms), with 
one approaching statistical significance (i.e., clinician-rated GAD symptoms). Only one 
comparison was statistically significant at posttreatment (i.e., self-rated GAD symptoms). These 
between-group comparisons are limited by our small sample size and restricted statistical power. 
However, our findings suggest that early sudden gains may be especially relevant to long-term 
outcome in CBT for GAD. This is consistent with the positive treatment outcomes associated 
with early sudden gains in depression (Busch et al., 2006; Kelley et al., 2005) and general 
psychopathology (Stiles et al., 2003). 
 This study had several strengths. First, we assessed sudden gains in both GAD symptoms 
and a cognitive mechanism underlying GAD symptoms (i.e., IU). This allowed us to investigate 
the relative proportions of sudden gains amongst these variables as well as their temporal 
sequence. Second, we used multiple measures to assess past-week GAD symptoms. This 
provided information about the relative importance and sequence of sudden gains in excessive 
worry and safety behaviours. Additionally, this is the first study to our knowledge that has 
evaluated sudden gains in GAD-related safety behaviours. Third, we used multiple measures of 
treatment outcome, including clinician- and self-rated instruments. All but one of these treatment 
outcome measures did not overlap with measures used to assess sudden gains. Fourth, we 
assessed both short- and long-term treatment outcomes. Fifth, our treatment protocol focused on 
a single therapeutic strategy (i.e., behavioural experiments). This reduces the need for a future 
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dismantling study that would compare the relative impact of multiple cognitive-behavioural 
techniques.  
This investigation also had important limitations. First, our small sample size decreased 
our statistical power and thus limited the statistical analyses that could be performed. Thus, it is 
unclear if the non-significant group comparisons at posttreatment are truly due to a lack of effect 
or alternatively due to limited power. Similarly, we could not statistically control for 
pretreatment group differences in depressive symptoms. Second, our sample consisted entirely of 
self-identified White Francophone participants. It is therefore unclear if our results will 
generalize to non-White and/or Anglophone populations. However, similar samples have been 
used in several previous investigations of CBT for GAD (e.g., Bélanger, Morin, Langlois, & 
Ladouceur, 2004; Primiano et al., 2014; Théberge-Lapointe, Marchand, Langlois, Gosselin, & 
Watts, 2015). Our Francophone sample also provides diversity within the sudden gains literature, 
which has primarily focused on Anglophones. Third, a waitlist or active control condition would 
have allowed us to assess spontaneous sudden gains (in the case of a waitlist control condition) 
or directly compare sudden gains across treatment modalities. 
Implications and Conclusions 
 Early sudden gains may improve long-term GAD treatment outcome in a number of 
ways. Rapid changes in beliefs and/or GAD symptoms in the first half of treatment may produce 
greater feelings of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977; Deschênes & Dugas, 2013; Kelly et al., 2005). 
This increased self-efficacy may become particularly relevant after active treatment has finished, 
as a participant must apply the skills learned in therapy without the support of his or her 
therapist. The novel treatment protocol used in this study may also partially explain the 
relationship between early sudden gains and treatment outcome. Early sudden gains in the 
context of the current study’s CBT protocol may signal more effective use of behavioural 
experiments, the proposed “active ingredient” of this therapy. Early sudden gains might indicate 
greater client understanding of the behavioural experiment technique, the identification of more 
personally relevant beliefs about uncertainty, or the early development of alternative beliefs 
about uncertainty. These changes may foster continued application of therapy skills, leading to 
greater reductions in GAD symptoms or increased resistance to relapse. 
 This CBT protocol’s emphasis on repeated behavioural experiments targeting beliefs 
about uncertainty may produce a greater proportion of sudden gains in IU and GAD symptoms 
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than previous studies. However, this possibility should be evaluated in a larger clinical trial. To 
establish the relative impact on cognitive versus behaviourally focused interventions in GAD, 
future investigations should compare sudden gains using behavioural experiments to sudden 
gains using habituation-based behavioural techniques (e.g., situational or imaginal exposure). 
Based on our findings regarding the precedence of sudden gains in beliefs over sudden gains in 
GAD symptoms, we also suggest that future sudden gains investigations incorporate measures of 






 IU is a dispositional characteristic that results from negative beliefs about uncertainty and 
the consequences of uncertainty (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). In our novel cognitive-behavioural 
conceptualization of IU, we proposed that catastrophically negative beliefs about uncertainty are 
activated when situational characteristics provoke feelings of uncertainty. These catastrophic, 
negative beliefs about uncertainty then result in the worry, anxiety, and safety behaviours 
characteristic of GAD (see Figure 2). The current program of research involved the development 
and evaluation of a novel CBT protocol based on this conceptual model. The protocol employed 
behavioural experiments to target idiosyncratic beliefs about uncertainty. A total of seven 
participants completed the 12-week CBT protocol, which included (1) psychoeducation and 
uncertainty awareness training, (2) repeated behavioural experiments to test idiosyncratic beliefs 
about uncertainty, and (3) relapse prevention. Overall, our results demonstrated that the 
treatment produced substantial reductions in IU and GAD symptoms by posttreatment that were 
relatively maintained across a 6-month follow-up period. Treatment also reduced general 
psychopathology symptoms over the study period, specifically depression and general anxiety. In 
addition, we found that sudden gains in IU tended to occur first rather than sudden gains in worry 
and safety behaviours. Improved long-term treatment outcome was associated with sudden gains 
that occurred early in treatment. This pattern of findings provides preliminary support for the 
efficacy of this parsimonious CBT protocol, as well as the utility of behavioural experiments for 
IU. We will discuss the theoretical and clinical implications of these results. 
Novel Conceptualization of IU 
 To maximize clinician understanding of, adherence to, and interest in CBT protocols, 
treatments must clearly articulate the specified theory of change. This should include detailed 
information about therapeutic concepts, their interrelationships, and how to best target these 
variables (David, 2004). The CBT protocol developed and evaluated for the current program of 
research was based on a novel cognitive-behavioural conceptualization of IU. This 
conceptualization is in keeping with traditional British models of psychopathology, including 
those for panic disorder (Clark, 1986), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Salkovskis, 1999), and 
hypochondriasis (Warwick & Salkvoskis, 1990). In each of these models, the individual 
misinterprets internal or external triggers, leading to a variety of emotional, physiological, 
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cognitive, and/or behavioural sequelae. Our CBT model of IU highlighted catastrophically 
negative beliefs about uncertainty as the motor that drives the symptoms of GAD. We proposed 
that specific situational characteristics – namely, ambiguity, novelty, and unpredictability – 
generate feelings of uncertainty. When this state of uncertainty is misinterpreted in a 
catastrophically negative manner, worry, anxiety, and safety behaviours occur. Overall, the 
findings from the current program of research indirectly supported this novel model of IU. The 
majority of therapy sessions within our protocol focused on catastrophically negative beliefs 
about uncertainty. Our largely positive short- and long-term treatment outcomes reinforce the 
centrality of these beliefs about uncertainty within GAD. Similarly, the temporal precedence of 
IU-related sudden gains emphasizes the proposed sequence of our conceptual model. However, 
this must be confirmed in future investigations, as the sequence of change within therapy may 
differ from the theoretical sequence of pathology prior to intervention. Moreover, the temporal 
sequence of change during treatment may differ when examined outside of sudden gains. 
The equality of worry, anxiety, and safety behaviours within our model was also 
indirectly supported. Although many GAD treatment techniques – such as worry scheduling 
(Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004) and imaginal exposure (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007) – 
address worry content directly, our model and treatment protocol did not highlight worry content 
per se. Our efficacy-related results suggest that it may not be necessary for cognitive-behavioural 
conceptualizations of GAD to focus on worry in order to produce successful therapeutic 
outcomes. This may have clinical utility for clients who have been unsuccessfully treated with 
worry-based interventions. Moreover, this may enhance the possible transdiagnostic applicability 
of our model and treatment for IU, given that the clinical emphasis remains on beliefs about 
uncertainty rather than disorder-specific symptoms. The conceptual addition of safety behaviours 
was also indirectly supported by our results, as this symptom dimension was endorsed by our 
clinical participants and decreased as a result of treatment. Future research should consider this 
often overlooked aspect of GAD. 
Behavioural Experiments for IU 
 Techniques that activate the sensory, experiential systems of anxiety in addition to verbal 
representations may be more successful than treatments that only impact one of these aspects. 
The development of new treatments may be most fruitful when both components are 
incorporated (McManus, Grey, & Shafran, 2008). In other words, clinicians should focus on 
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“doing therapy” rather than “talking therapy” (Waller, 2009). Behavioural experiments may 
represent the ideal technique for addressing both cognitions and behaviours in an experiential 
manner. Behavioural experiments, which have been identified as an effective therapeutic 
technique in the treatment of anxiety, are present in several CBT protocols for anxiety disorders 
(Woody & Ollendick, 2006). To our knowledge, the current program of research was the first to 
evaluate the use of systematic behavioural experiments as a stand-alone treatment for GAD. 
We found that behavioural experiments targeting beliefs about uncertainty were 
efficacious in reducing IU, GAD symptoms, and general psychopathology. This suggests that 
behavioural experiments have both specific and generalized effects. On the one hand, this 
technique can effectively target highly specialized constructs: our results demonstrate that we 
were indeed able to target IU successfully. On the other hand, targeting beliefs about uncertainty 
via behavioural experiments reduced GAD symptoms as well as more peripheral symptoms of 
general psychopathology. This is consistent with cognitive mediation theories of emotion and 
psychopathology (e.g., Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1979), which suggest that changes in underlying 
beliefs precede changes in symptomatology. Our behavioural experiment-based treatment 
targeted underlying beliefs about uncertainty throughout the 12-week therapy period, and 
produced substantial changes in GAD symptoms at posttreatment and 6-month follow-up. Our 
findings regarding sudden gains also provide some support for cognitive mediation, as sudden 
gains involving IU were most likely to occur first. Cognitive mediation theory suggests that 
symptoms may not need to be targeted directly in order for treatment to be successful. Indeed, 
our behavioural experiments did not need to target GAD symptoms in order to reduce them. This 
provides a novel focus within the GAD literature, as previously published behavioural 
experiments for GAD have often emphasized worry content even when targeting IU (Butler & 
Rouf, 2005). 
 The current program of research also demonstrated that behavioural experiments can be 
used in isolation as the sole means of targeting IU. This stands in contrast to the traditional 
method of treating IU, in which a combination of cognitive-behavioural techniques has been 
used (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007). The inherent flexibility of behavioural experiments allowed 
participants to test idiosyncratic beliefs about uncertainty rather than a narrow, prescribed range 
of cognitions. This encouraged creativity and individualization within a structured framework. 
Thus, behavioural experiments represent a parsimonious, flexible, and direct method of targeting 
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beliefs about uncertainty that may provide comparable reductions in IU. In fact, we found 
preliminary evidence to suggest that the current behavioural experiment-based protocol may 
produce larger changes in IU than our standard CBT-IU protocol. However, this finding should 
be interpreted with caution given the small sample size and lack of direct comparison between 
treatment protocols. 
Behavioural experiments produced sudden gains in IU, suggesting that beliefs about 
uncertainty can undergo rapid between-session changes in addition to gradual change over time. 
Behavioural experiments may promote sudden gains in beliefs about uncertainty via the 
experiential learning and reflection inherent in the technique (Bennett-Levy et al., 2005; Kolb, 
1984; Lewin, 1946). Participants were encouraged to treat their beliefs about uncertainty as 
hypotheses to be tested. Participants then monitored and actively reflected on the relationship 
between the experiment’s outcome and their beliefs about uncertainty. Behavioural experiments 
may have also fostered sudden gains in IU via activation of both the implicational and 
propositional information processing systems (Teasdale, 1997; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). This 
participatory style of learning, active reflection, and activation of both implicational and 
propositional information processing may all promote rapid between-session changes in IU as 
well as GAD symptoms. Sudden gains that occur early in a behavioural experiment-based 
therapy may be more relevant to long-term GAD treatment outcome than to short-term 
outcomes. Early “successes” in behavioural experiments may promote sudden gains. “Successes” 
might include the targeting of more relevant cognitions, experiments that generate greater 
information, or enhanced client understanding of the rationale or procedural steps of a 
behavioural experiment. These early successes could create a “positive spiral” (Kelly, Roberts, & 
Ciesla, 2005) that enhances perceived self-efficacy. When sudden gains occur early in therapy, 
they may allow clients to capitalize on their gains and have greater opportunities to practice 
newly learned skills, facilitated by the therapist. If the client has greater mastery of the cognitive-
behavioural technique, this may provide a “safety net” for participants once therapy has ended, 
promoting long-term maintenance of gains and preventing relapse. 
 Behavioural experiments for IU may have reduced symptoms of GAD and general 
psychopathology in several ways. Behavioural experiments employ principles of experiential 
learning and reflection (Kolb, 1984; Lewin, 1946) to promote change. This perspective suggests 
that participants gained information by engaging in experiential exercises and later used active 
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reflection to process this information in the context of their pre-existing belief structures. The 
information gained in early behavioural experiments possibly disconfirmed some or all aspects 
of participants’ pre-existing negative beliefs about uncertainty. In modern learning theory, the 
violation of negative expectations (Bouton, 2004; McMillan & Lee, 2010) is theorized to lead to 
reduced anxiety and fear responses. The disconfirmatory experiences fostered by behavioural 
experiment may have modified participants’ existing beliefs about uncertainty (Salkovskis, 
Hackmann, Wells, Gelder, & Clark, 2006) or may have generated new beliefs or mental 
representations (Bouton, 2004; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Pearce & Hall, 1980). Similarly, 
behavioural experiments may have generated alternative mental representations by engaging 
both the propositional and implicational information processing systems (Bennett-Levy et al., 
2005; Teasdale, 1997; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). These changes in beliefs about uncertainty 
then, according to cognitive mediation theory, may have caused cascading changes in GAD 
symptomatology. 
Implications for GAD Treatment Practices 
 Despite the introduction of several empirically-supported treatments since the 1990s, 
GAD remains the least successfully treated of all anxiety disorders (Gould, Safren, O’Neill 
Washington, & Otto, 2004). For instance, GAD relapse rates of 50% are not uncommon 
(Holaway, Rodebaugh, & Heimberg, 2006). Without treatment, the clinical picture is 
disheartening: GAD has a chronic course (Lydiard, 2000) with few spontaneous remissions 
(Yonkers, Warshaw, Massion, & Keller, 1996). Thus, improvements in GAD treatment remain 
critical. In addition to concerns of efficacy, there have been calls for greater parsimony, 
efficiency, and cost-effectiveness in treatment protocols (Cougle, 2012; Mansell, 2008; 
McManus, Van Doorn, & Yiend, 2012). Available treatments for GAD are based on several 
theoretical perspectives and incorporate a variety of cognitive-behavioural techniques (Behar, 
DiMarco, Hekler, Mohlman, & Staples, 2009), making clinical decision-making difficult. This 
may be particularly problematic in routine clinical settings, given the reduction in supervised 
training in CBT for GAD between 1993-2003 (Woody, Weisz, & McLean, 2005).  
The current program of research provides preliminary evidence for the efficacy of a novel 
cognitive-behavioural treatment for GAD. Equally, this treatment demonstrates the potential 
power of parsimony and efficiency. Empirically supported treatments for GAD have typically 
been complex, involving multiple cognitive-behavioural techniques (e.g., Borkovec, Newman, 
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Pincus, & Lytle, 2002; Dugas & Robichaud, 2007; Mennin, 2004; Wells, 2006) and taking 
upwards of 14 sessions to administer in a research context (e.g., Newman, Przeworski, Fisher, & 
Borkovec, 2010; van der Heiden et al., 2012). The current treatment protocol requires clinicians 
to master only one major therapeutic strategy – thus reducing an important barrier to effective 
knowledge translation (Cougle, 2012; Dimeff et al., 2009; Mansell, 2008). This may be 
particularly important for clinicians with less specialized clinical training in psychological 
treatments, such as nurses and social workers (Bright, Baker, Neimeyer, 1999). Fewer training 
hours are likely required for less complex interventions (Dimeff et al., 2009; Nadort et al., 2009; 
Rollinson et al., 2007). Moreover, clients may benefit from the repeated practice of a single 
therapeutic technique, promoting the maintenance of therapeutic gains (Cougle, 2012). Because 
the current treatment protocol required only 12 sessions to administer, it may reduce some of the 
direct and indirect costs of GAD treatment such as therapist fees, transportation costs to and from 
therapy appointments, and missed time at work (Cougle, 2012; McManus et al., 2012). 
The current treatment protocol also has advantages that enhance its clinical utility. The 
flexibility of this treatment protocol allows for customization based on individual client needs. 
Although the protocol offers 60 behavioural experiments to select from based on the target 
cognition, clients and clinicians are encouraged to generate alternative behavioural experiments 
to ensure feasibility and relevance. In other words, participants were taught the skills necessary 
to design and carry out successful behavioural experiments rather than simply led through 
predetermined exercises. This improves the ecological validity of the treatment protocol, as it 
allows for individualization based on case formulation (Persons, 2006). Moreover, this may 
enhance treatment dissemination efforts, as perceived restriction of clinical creativity and 
innovation may be a barrier to the implementation of empirically-supported treatments in routine 
clinical practice (Gunter & Whittal, 2010).  
Future Directions 
 The current program of research built upon previous treatment studies for GAD (e.g., 
Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000), and attempted to address increasing calls for treatment parsimony 
and efficiency (Cougle, 2012). The program of research had a number of strengths. First, 
conducting a small-scale evaluation of a novel treatment protocol conserves research and clinical 
resources while ensuring that only promising avenues are pursued. Second, we used a variety of 
measures and methods to evaluate treatment outcome. We used both clinician-rated and self-
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report measures and assessed the statistical and clinical significance of change using several 
methods. Third, we investigated sudden gains in terms of both GAD symptoms and IU. Fourth, 
we assessed outcomes at a variety of time points to determine the short and long-term effects of 
therapy. This provides information about immediate outcomes as well as the durability of 
treatment effects. Fifth, our protocol design reduced the need for a future dismantling study, as it 
focused on one major therapeutic technique. This is a considerable advantage within the CBT 
literature, as the majority of efficacy studies concern multicomponent CBT protocols 
(Westbrook, Kennerly, & Kirk, 2005) and do not identify the most critical intervention strategies 
(Longmore & Worrell, 2007). Using one major therapeutic technique increases treatment 
efficiency, but may also aid dissemination efforts given that clinician training would focus on a 
narrow range of cognitive-behavioural skills (Cougle, 2012; Mansell, 2008). In addition to these 
strengths, our studies also had several weaknesses. First, our small sample size reduced our 
statistical power and thus restricted our selection of statistical analyses. Second, our sample was 
restricted to White, Francophone participants. However, the inclusion of French-speaking 
participants contributes diversity to the GAD and anxiety literatures. Third, we did not include a 
waitlist or active control condition. Thus, we were not able to statistically control for the effects 
of time or common therapy factors. Finally, our measure of safety behaviours in GAD has not 
yet been empirically validated. Thus, these findings must be interpreted with caution. 
 Combining the strengths and limitations of the current program of research, there are 
several interesting avenues that could be pursued in future investigations. First, future research 
should extend our findings to address the question, “Does this treatment work?” This would 
include a randomized controlled trial with a larger sample size and a waitlist control condition. 
This will provide greater statistical power and permit analyses to be conducted in multilevel 
modeling – providing a more nuanced account of treatment outcome. This would also allow the 
results to be generalized beyond the current studies’ participants, therapist, hospital site, and 
geographical location. Following this, comparison to an active control condition may be 
warranted. Future replication studies should consider measures of short- and long-term cost 
effectiveness, quality of life indices, as well as additional variables known to be associated with 
GAD (e.g., neuroticism). The transdiagnostic applicability of this novel model and treatment for 
IU may warrant investigation, given the calls for the provision of CBT based on cognitive 
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mechanisms rather than diagnostic categories (Mansell, 2008). Our protocol’s flexibility, 
structure, and focus on IU may be advantageous in this context.  
Second, future investigations should extend our findings to address the question, “How 
does this therapy work?” via process-based research. Although we found interesting evidence 
concerning the temporal sequence of change within this treatment protocol, future research 
should confirm and extend these results. Future sudden gains studies should consider the 
inclusion of general anxiety and somatic anxiety symptoms in addition to the variables assessed 
in the current program of research. Daily monitoring could be considered as an alternative to 
weekly self-monitoring of symptoms to allow for time series analyses.  
Third, experimental research should directly compare behavioural experiments and 
exposure for IU within a GAD population. This would provide key information regarding the 
relative efficacy and acceptability of these two techniques, as has been examined in panic 
disorder (Salkovskis et al., 2007). Based on our study design, it is also currently unclear if 
behavioural experiments that focus on IU have greater clinical utility than ones focusing on 
worry. However, behavioural experiments that focus on underlying cognitive mechanisms may 
avoid the potential pitfalls of those focused on worry. For example, behavioural experiments 
targeting worry may focus on disproving worry content while inadvertently fostering the need 
for certainty (Butler & Rouf, 2005). However, this should be evaluated empirically. 
Finally, future research should address key measures of safety behaviours and IU. The 
safety behaviour measure introduced in this study should be empirically validated. Clinical 
observations (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007) as well as empirical investigations (e.g., Beesdo-Baum 
et al., 2012) implicate a number of safety behaviours in GAD. Psychometric validation of a 
GAD-specific safety behaviours measure would improve our understanding of this phenomenon 
as well as its relationship to successful treatment. Similarly, future investigations should consider 
including a more general measure of beliefs about uncertainty in order to quantitatively assess 
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Advertisement for Participant Recruitment 
Êtes-vous une personne inquiète? 
 
Le Laboratoire des troubles anxieux de l’Université Concordia en collaboration avec la 
Clinique des troubles anxieux de l’Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal est à la recherche de 
personnes qui s’inquiètent de façon excessive ou exagérée pour participer à une étude 
évaluant un nouveau traitement psychologique. 
 
Si vous avez entre 18 ou plus et que vous êtes en bonne santé physique, vous pourriez être 
éligible pour participer à l’étude. 
 
Pour plus d’information, veuillez téléphoner au : 514-848-2424, poste 5085 
 
Université Concordia 
Laboratoire des troubles anxieux 











FORMULAIRE D’INFORMATION ET DE CONSENTEMENT TÉLÉPHONIQUE1 
(Évaluation de l’admissibilité) 
 
Titre de l’étude : Une nouvelle psychothérapie pour le trouble d'anxiété généralisée:  
Les expériences comportementales pour l'intolérance à l'incertitude 
 
Chercheur principal :  Michel Dugas, Ph.D. 
 Chercheur, Centre de recherche, HSCM 
 Psychologue, Clinique des troubles anxieux, HSCM 
 Professeur titulaire, Département de psychologie, Université 
Concordia 
 Tél : 514-338-4201 ou 514-848-2424 poste 2215 
 Courriel : Michel.Dugas@concordia.ca 
Co-chercheur: Elizabeth Hebert, M.A., candidate au Ph.D. (psychologie),  
Département de psychologie, Université Concordia 
Collaborateurs :  Pierre Savard, MD, Ph.D.; Julie Turcotte, MD, M.Sc.; Thu Van Dao, MD; 
Éric Bugeaud, MD; Psychiatres,  




A. BUT DE L’ÉTUDE 
Le but de cette étude est de déterminer si une nouvelle thérapie cognitivo-comportementale 
visant principalement l’intolérance à l’incertitude peut s’avérer efficace pour des adultes 
souffrant du trouble d’anxiété généralisée (TAG). La thérapie cognitivo-comportementale est 
une forme de psychothérapie qui vise à vous aider à comprendre et à changer les comportements 
et pensées qui contribuent à vos difficultés. 
La première partie de l’étude consiste à évaluer de façon préliminaire la nature et la 
sévérité de vos symptômes anxieux afin de déterminer si vous rencontrez les critères de 
sélection pour passer à la seconde étape d’évaluation et par la suite recevoir le traitement 
pour le trouble d’anxiété généralisée. 
                                                             





Dans un premier temps, vous participerez à une entrevue d’évaluation téléphonique (durée 
1 h 30) avec un psychologue de l’équipe. 
S’il semble que vous rencontrez les critères de sélection de l’étude, vous serez référé à la 
Clinique des troubles anxieux de l’Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal, où vous serez évalué 
à nouveau par un psychiatre de notre équipe. Cette évaluation se déroule en personne et 
est d’une durée d’une heure environ.  Au début de cette rencontre, vous signerez le présent 
formulaire de consentement. Après cette évaluation, les membres de l’équipe de recherche 
(psychologues, psychiatres et chercheur principal) se réuniront pour discuter et s’assurer 
que vous rencontrez bien les critères requis pour l’étude.  Nous vous ferons ensuite part de 
la décision de l’équipe. 
Si vous rencontrez les critères pour être inclus dans l’étude, vous aurez à signer un autre 
formulaire de consentement concernant la suite de l’étude. Si vous ne rencontrez pas les 
critères requis pour participer à l’étude, une liste de ressources sera mise à votre 
disposition. 
C. RISQUES ET BÉNÉFICES 
1. Risques, effets secondaires et désagréments 
Il n’est pas impossible que certaines questions provoquent un léger malaise à court terme 
(possiblement en vous faisant réfléchir à vos difficultés). Par contre, ces entrevues ont déjà 
été utilisées à plusieurs reprises auprès des personnes anxieuses et les malaises sont rares. 
Si cela vous arrive, nous vous prions d’en discuter avec nous. 
 2. Bénéfices et avantages 
En participant à cette étude, vous bénéficierez d’une évaluation détaillée de votre état. 
Évidemment, si vous rencontrez les critères de sélection pour l’étude de traitement, vous 
recevrez une psychothérapie efficace pour le traitement du TAG. Parallèlement, vous 
pourrez contribuer à l’avancement des connaissances en participant à cette étude. 
D. CONDITIONS DE PARTICIPATION 
1. Compensation 
Vous ne recevrez aucune compensation financière pour votre participation à cette étude. 
 2. Confidentialité 
Tous les renseignements recueillis à votre sujet demeureront strictement confidentiels, 
dans les limites prévues par la loi, et vous ne serez identifié que par un code. 
3. Indemnisation en cas de préjudice 
En acceptant de participer à cette étude, vous ne renoncez à aucun de vos droits et vous ne 
libérez pas les chercheurs, l’organisme subventionnaire (Instituts de recherche en santé du 
Canada) ou les établissements impliqués de leurs responsabilités légales et 
professionnelles. 
4. Participation volontaire et retrait de l’étude 
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Votre participation à cette étude est volontaire. Vous êtes donc libre de refuser d’y 
participer. Vous pouvez également vous retirer de l’étude à n’importe quel moment, sans 
avoir à donner de raisons, en faisant connaître votre décision au chercheur ou à l’un des 
membres de l’équipe de recherche. 
 5. Personnes à contacter 
Si vous avez des questions à poser concernant vos droits en tant que participant à un projet 
de recherche, ou si vous avez des plaintes ou des commentaires à formuler, vous pouvez 
communiquer avec (1) la Direction Générale de l’Hôpital du Sacré-Coeur, au (514) 338-
2222, poste 3581; ou (2) le Conseiller en Éthique de la Recherche de l’Université Concordia, 








o Je comprends que je donne mon consentement verbal pour que l’équipe de 
recherche évalue si je rencontre les critères de sélection de l’étude. 
o Je comprends que si je suis invité à l’évaluation qui se déroulera en personne à la 
Clinique des troubles anxieux, j’y signerai le présent formulaire de consentement. 
o Je comprends que je peux retirer mon consentement et interrompre ma 
participation à tout moment, sans conséquences négatives. 
o Je comprends que ma participation à cette étude est CONFIDENTIELLE (c.-à-d. les 
membres de l’équipe connaissent mon identité mais ne la révèleront pas). 
J’AI ÉCOUTÉ ATTENTIVEMENT CE QUI M’A ÉTÉ LU ET JE COMPRENDS LA NATURE DE 
CETTE ÉTUDE:   
OUI_____ NON_____  
JE CONSENS DONC VERBALEMENT, DE FAÇON LIBRE ET VOLONTAIRE À PARTICIPER À 
L’ÉVALUATION TÉLÉPHONIQUE ET S’IL Y A LIEU À LA RENCONTRE AVEC UN 
PSYCHIATRE DE L’ÉQUIPE : 








Nom de la personne qui obtient 














Information and Consent for Treatment 
 
 
         
 
 
FORMULAIRE D’INFORMATION ET DE CONSENTEMENT 2 
 
Titre de l’étude: Une nouvelle psychothérapie pour le trouble d'anxiété 
généralisée: Les expériences comportementales pour 
l'intolérance à l'incertitude 
 
Chercheur: 
o Michel Dugas, Ph. D. (psychologie) 
Chercheur, Centre de recherche, HSCM 
Psychologue, Clinique des troubles anxieux, HSCM 
Professeur titulaire, Département de psychologie, Université Concordia 
Tél : 514-338-4201 ou 514-848-2424 (poste 2215) 
Courriel : Michel.Dugas@concordia.ca 
 
Co-chercheur: 
o Elizabeth Hebert, M.A., candidate au Ph.D. (psychologie), Département de 
psychologie, Université Concordia 
Collaborateurs :  
o Pierre Savard, MD, Ph.D.; Julie Turcotte, MD, M.Sc.; Thu Van Dao, MD; Éric Bugeaud, 




Préambule :  
Nous sollicitons votre participation à un projet de recherche. Cependant, avant d’accepter de 
participer à ce projet et de signer ce formulaire d’information et de consentement, veuillez 
prendre le temps de lire, de comprendre et de considérer attentivement les renseignements 
qui suivent. 
                                                             
2 Le genre masculin, employé pour alléger le texte, désigne autant les femmes que les hommes. 
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Ce formulaire peut contenir des mots que vous ne comprenez pas. Nous vous invitons à poser 
toutes les questions que vous jugerez utiles au chercheur responsable du projet ou aux autres 
membres du personnel affecté au projet de recherche et à leur demander de vous expliquer 
tout mot ou renseignement qui n’est pas clair. 
Une participation simultanée à plusieurs études pourrait vous être préjudiciable. Si vous 
participez déjà à d’autres études, veuillez en informer le chercheur. 
1. Nature et objectif de l’étude 
Le trouble d’anxiété généralisée (TAG) se caractérise par la présence excessive et chronique 
d’inquiétudes et d’anxiété.  Notre équipe de recherche a précédemment développé et validé 
un protocole de traitement cognitivo-comportemental pour les personnes atteintes du TAG. 
L’efficacité de notre traitement a maintenant été évaluée dans cinq essais randomisés. En 
général, les données indiquent que le traitement mène à la rémission du TAG chez 75% des 
personnes atteintes et que les gains thérapeutiques se maintiennent pour au moins deux ans 
suite à l’intervention. Alors que ces résultats sont encourageants, il n’en demeure pas moins 
que 25% des personnes présentent une faible réponse au traitement. De plus, ce protocole est 
passablement complexe puisqu’il compte 6 composantes administrées sur 14 à 16 rencontres. 
En d’autres mots, malgré sa relative efficacité, l’utilité clinique de notre traitement demeure 
un point d’interrogation. 
L’étude proposée vise à évaluer de façon préliminaire l’acceptabilité et l’efficacité d’un 
nouveau protocole de traitement pour le TAG. Ce nouveau protocole est moins complexe que 
son prédécesseur. Il cible uniquement le facteur principal du traitement précédent; à savoir 
l’intolérance à l’incertitude qui est une caractéristique importante chez les personnes qui 
s’inquiètent de façon excessive. De plus, le nouveau protocole prévoit qu’une seule 
intervention (les expériences comportementales) sera utilisée pour cibler l’intolérance à 
l’incertitude sur un maximum de 10 rencontres de psychothérapie. Ainsi, cette étude 
permettra de faire une évaluation préliminaire d’une nouvelle forme de thérapie cognitivo-
comportementale plus simple; celle-ci sera potentiellement plus facile à enseigner aux 
thérapeutes, plus facile à suivre et moins contraignante pour les personnes atteintes du TAG.  
Dix (10) adultes avec un diagnostic principal de trouble d’anxiété généralisée participeront à 
cette étude qui se déroulera dans les locaux de la Clinique des troubles anxieux de l’Hôpital 
du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal. Les participants seront recrutés à cette Clinique et par le biais 
d’annonces placées dans les journaux comme La Presse, par exemple.   
2. Déroulement de l’étude et méthodes utilisées 
Si vous acceptez de participer à cette étude, vous devrez signer ce formulaire d’information 
et de consentement. 
L’étude se divise en trois volet : (1) évaluation pré-thérapie; (2) thérapie cognitivo-
comportementale administrée en 10 rencontres hebdomadaires; (3) évaluation après 5 
rencontres de thérapie, une semaine après la fin de la thérapie et deux évaluations de suivi (3 
et 6 mois après la fin de la thérapie).   
Premier volet : Évaluation pré-thérapie 
Suite à l’évaluation de vos symptômes d’anxiété – entrevues téléphoniques et entrevue avec 
un psychiatre à la Clinique des troubles anxieux – nous avons déterminé que vous rencontrez 
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les critères d’inclusion de cette étude. Vous participerez maintenant à une rencontre 
d’environ une heure avec un psychologue de notre équipe.  Au cours de cette rencontre vous 
répondrez à des questionnaires portant sur vos symptômes d’anxiété et votre état général.  
Deuxième volet : thérapie cognitivo-comportementale (TCC) 
En participant à cette étude, vous recevrez une psychothérapie pour le TAG.  Cette thérapie, 
de type cognitivo-comportementale, vise à vous aider à comprendre et à changer les 
comportements et pensées qui contribuent à vos difficultés. La durée de cette thérapie est 
d’environ trois mois (10 rencontres hebdomadaires d’une durée de 50 minutes) et elle vous 
sera administrée par un des psychologues de notre équipe. Entre les rencontres, vous aurez 
des lectures à faire et des exercices à compléter. 
Troisième volet : Évaluation après 5 rencontres de thérapie, à la fin de la thérapie et 2 
évaluations de suivi 
Afin d’évaluer les effets de la psychothérapie à court et à long terme, vous serez évalué à 
quatre  reprises : après 5 rencontres de thérapie ainsi qu’une semaine, 3 mois et 6 mois après 
la fin de la thérapie. Ces rencontres d’évaluation comprennent une entrevue diagnostique et 
des questionnaires.  
3. Risques, effets secondaires et désagréments 
Évaluations 
Il n’est pas impossible que certaines tâches ou certains questionnaires provoquent un 
léger malaise à court terme (possiblement en vous faisant réfléchir à vos difficultés). 
Par contre, ces tâches et questionnaires ont déjà été utilisés auprès des personnes 
anxieuses et les malaises sont rares. Si cela vous arrive, nous vous prions d’en discuter 
avec la professionnelle de recherche ou avec votre thérapeute. 
Psychothérapie 
Il est possible que quelques-uns des exercices prescrits par votre psychologue 
provoquent certains malaises à court terme. Ceux-ci sont temporaires et disparaissent 
habituellement avec la pratique répétée de ces exercices. 
Si vous recevez un médicament prescrit par votre médecin ou votre psychiatre au 
moment du début de l’étude, cela demeure la responsabilité de ce dernier pendant la 
durée du traitement. Cependant, nous vous demandons seulement de ne pas augmenter 
le dosage de votre médication ou de modifier le type de médicament sans en avertir 
préalablement votre thérapeute. 
4. Bénéfices et avantages 
Tel que mentionné précédemment, en participant à cette étude, vous recevrez une 
psychothérapie pour le TAG. Cette thérapie vous sera offerte par des psychologues qui 
sont des experts dans son application. Vous profiterez aussi d’une évaluation plus 
poussée de votre état, avec un suivi sur une période de 6 mois après la fin de la 
psychothérapie. Parallèlement, cette étude permettra de savoir si une thérapie plus 
simple, ciblant uniquement l'intolérance à l'incertitude, s'avère efficace pour diminuer 
les symptômes du TAG. Ainsi, cette étude contribuera à l’avancement des connaissances 




Vous ne recevrez aucune compensation financière pour votre participation à cette 
étude. 
6. Confidentialité 
Tous les renseignements recueillis à votre sujet au cours de l’étude demeureront 
strictement confidentiels, dans les limites prévues par la loi, et vous ne serez identifié 
que par un code. Les rencontres avec les psychologues seront enregistrées (audio 
seulement) afin de nous permettre d’évaluer la qualité des interventions offertes par 
ceux-ci (les fichiers audio seront aussi identifiés par un code). Immédiatement après la 
publication de cette étude, tous ces fichiers seront détruits. Aucune publication ou 
communication scientifique résultant de cette étude ne renfermera quoi que ce soit qui 
puisse permettre de vous identifier. 
Cependant, à des fins de contrôle du projet de recherche, votre dossier pourra être 
consulté par une personne mandatée par le comité d’éthique de la recherche de 
l’Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal ainsi que par des représentants de l’organisme de 
subvention (Instituts de recherche en santé du Canada). Tous ces organismes adhèrent 
à une politique de stricte confidentialité. 
7. Indemnisation en cas de préjudice 
Si vous deviez subir quelque préjudice que ce soit résultant de votre participation à 
cette étude, vous recevrez tous les soins médicaux nécessaires, sans frais de votre part. 
Toutefois, ceci ne vous empêche nullement d’exercer un recours légal en cas de faute 
reprochée à toute personne impliquée dans l’étude. 
En acceptant de participer à cette étude, vous ne renoncez à aucun de vos droits ni ne 
libérez les chercheurs, l’organisme subventionnaire (Instituts de recherche en santé du 
Canada) ou les établissements impliqués de leur responsabilité civile et professionnelle. 
8. Participation volontaire et retrait de l’étude 
Votre participation à cette étude est volontaire. Vous êtes donc libre de refuser d’y 
participer. Vous pouvez également vous retirer de l’étude à n’importe quel moment, 
sans avoir à donner de raisons, en faisant connaitre votre décision au chercheur ou à 
l’un des membres de l’équipe de recherche. Toute nouvelle connaissance acquise durant 
le déroulement de l’étude qui pourrait affecter votre décision de continuer d’y 
participer vous sera communiquée sans délai. 
Votre décision de vous en retirer n’aura aucune conséquence sur les soins qui vous 
seront fournis par la suite ou sur vos relations avec votre médecin et les autres 
intervenants. 
Le chercheur responsable, le comité d’éthique de la recherche de l’Hôpital du Sacré-
Cœur de Montréal ou l’organisme subventionnaire (IRSC) peuvent mettre fin à votre 
participation, sans votre consentement, si de nouvelles découvertes ou informations 
indiquent que votre participation au projet n’est plus dans votre intérêt, si vous ne 
respectez pas les consignes du projet de recherche ou s’il existe des raisons 
administratives d’abandonner le projet. 
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9. Personnes à contacter 
Si vous avez des questions à poser au sujet de cette étude ou s’il survient un incident 
quelconque ou si vous désirez vous retirer de l’étude, vous pouvez contacter en tout 
temps le Dr Michel Dugas (le chercheur principal de l’étude) aux numéros de téléphone 
suivants :  
o Département de psychologie, Université Concordia : (514) 848-2424, poste 
2215 
o Clinique des troubles anxieux, Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal : (514) 338-
4201  
Si vous voulez poser des questions à un professionnel ou à un chercheur qui n’est pas 
impliqué dans cette étude, vous pouvez communiquer avec Dr Normand Lussier, 
omnipraticien à la Clinique des troubles anxieux, au (514) 338-4201. 
Si vous avez des questions à poser concernant vos droits en tant que participant à un 
projet de recherche, ou si vous avez des plaintes ou des commentaires à formuler, vous 
pouvez communiquer avec (1) la Direction Générale de l’Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de 
Montréal, au (514) 338-2222, poste 3581; ou (2) le Conseiller en Éthique de la 
Recherche de l’Université Concordia, au (514) 848-2424, poste 7481 ou à 
« ethics@alcor.concordia.ca ». 
10. Surveillance des aspects éthiques du projet 
Les comités d’éthique de la recherche de l’Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal et de 
l’Université Concordia ont approuvé ce projet de recherche et en assurent le suivi.  De 
plus, ils approuveront au préalable toute révision et toute modification apportée au 








Titre de l’étude :  Une nouvelle psychothérapie pour le trouble d'anxiété généralisée: 
Les expériences comportementales pour l'intolérance à l'incertitude 
La nature de cette étude, les procédés utilisés, les risques et les bénéfices que comporte ma 
participation à cette étude ainsi que le caractère confidentiel des informations qui seront 
recueillies au cours de l’étude m’ont été expliqués. 
J’ai eu l’occasion de poser toutes mes questions concernant les différents aspects de cette 
étude et on y a répondu à ma satisfaction. 
Je reconnais qu’on m’a laissé le temps voulu pour prendre ma décision. 
J’accepte volontairement de participer à cette étude. Je demeure libre de m’en retirer en tout 
temps sans que cela ne nuise aux relations avec mon médecin ou les autres intervenants et 
sans préjudice d’aucune sorte. 




Nom du participant Signature Date 
 
Signature de la personne qui a obtenu le consentement si différent du chercheur responsable 
du projet de recherche. 
 
J’ai expliqué au participant les termes du présent formulaire d’information et de 








Signature et engagement du chercheur responsable du projet 
 
Je certifie qu’on a expliqué au participant les termes du présent formulaire d’information et de 
consentement, que l’on a répondu aux questions qu’il avait à cet égard et qu’on lui a 
clairement indiqué qu’il demeure libre de mettre un terme à sa participation, et ce, sans 
préjudice.  
Je m’engage, avec l’équipe de recherche, à respecter ce qui a été convenu au formulaire 
d’information et de consentement et à en remettre une copie signée au participant.  
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Appendix F: Generalized Anxiety Disorder-Safety Behaviours Questionnaire – Past Week 
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